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I. INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have seen life in America dramatically altered by
the digital revolution.1 Minors, including both small children and mature
adolescents,2 are increasingly involved in online activities that generate

* Edwin M. Thomas Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. Many thanks to my
excellent student researchers, editors, and collaborators—Eli McCann, Brandon Crowther, and
Timothy West—and the faculty participants of various workshops and conferences who provided
feedback on various drafts of this article.
1. See, e.g., JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 1–15 (2008); David Buckingham, Is There a Digital
Generation?, in DIGITAL GENERATIONS: CHILDREN, YOUNG PEOPLE, AND NEW MEDIA 1–12 (David
Buckingham & Rebekah Willet eds., 2006).
2. A legal “infant” or “minor” refers to anyone under age eighteen in almost all states. 5
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:3 (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter WILLISTON]. The
adult in such transactions, whether acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another person or entity,
is sometimes referred to as the “major.” The age of majority was generally lowered to eighteen in
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profits for online service providers (OSPs). According to recent studies,
approximately ninety-five percent of teens ages twelve to seventeen were
online in 2011,3 seventy percent go online daily, and nearly fifty percent go
online several times a day.4 Eighty percent of those online teens used social
network sites.5 Providers of such “free” web services do so intending to
recover their costs and make significant profit from advertisements and other
monetized features. Economic incentives drive OSPs to increase their teen
user base, as well as their adult user base. In addition, because of youths’
widespread online presence, combined with increasing access to money,6
“children comprise a significant segment of online consumers, a segment
that is rapidly enlarging.”7 According to a 2010 Pew Research Center
Internet study, “48% of wired teens have bought things online like books,
clothing or music.”8 The most popular sites for minors include eBay,
Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and MySpace,9 and almost three million minors
make purchases online every month.10
OSPs almost universally present their potential online customer or user
with an adhesive contract containing extensive administrative terms. These
ongoing licensing agreements—intended to govern use of e-mail, online
games, and other forms of intellectual property services, as well as
commitments made in creating an account for purchasing goods—are
typically identified as “Terms of Service,” “Terms of Use,” “Conditions of
Use,” “Terms and Conditions,” “End User License Agreements,” and so

the early 1970s. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. a (1981) (“49 States have
lowered the age of majority, either generally or for contract capacity, to less than twenty-one;
usually, the age is eighteen.”).
3. AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET, TEENS, KINDNESS AND CRUELTY ON SOCIAL
NETWORK SITES: HOW AMERICAN TEENS NAVIGATE THE NEW WORLD OF “DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP”
15 (Nov. 9, 2011), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Teens-and-social-media.aspx.
4. Id. at 16.
5. Id.
6. MEDIAMARK RESEARCH INC., TEEN MARKET PROFILE 7 (2004), available at
http://www.magazine.org/content/files/teenprofile04.pdf (revealing that in 2003, teens ages twelve to
seventeen spent $112.5 billion).
7. Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to
Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 255 (2008) (citing RONALD J. MANN &
JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 202 (2d ed. 2005)); see also Larry Cunningham, A
Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their
Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 293 (2006) (“Minors make a great deal of
contributions to the marketplace as consumers, employees, and sellers.”).
8. AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA & MOBILE INTERNET USE
AMONG TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 4 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/
Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx.
9. ROBERT BROWN & RUTH WASHTON, PACKAGED FACTS, THE TEENS MARKET IN THE U.S.
54–56 (June 2007) (citing SIMMONS MARKET RESEARCH BUREAU, TEENS NATIONAL CONSUMER
SURVEY (2006)).
10. Id. at 53 (listing 12.4% of the roughly twenty-five million teen population as having made a
purchase in the last thirty days).

226

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 225, 2012]

2/13/2012 2:03 PM

CyberInfants
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

forth (hereinafter collectively and singularly “TOS”). These contracts may
be characterized as “clickwrap,” “browsewrap,”11 or other “wrap”
contracts,12 referring to the method of formation.13 TOS have generally been
found to be enforceable as a matter of contract law, although some courts
and many commentators have challenged this result by suggesting that TOS
are almost never read, comprehended, or negotiated, and frequently invoke
very little evidence of assent, even when the included terms are not
unconscionable.14 Even if generally enforced against adults, minors can
frequently void TOS under the traditional infancy doctrine.
The infancy doctrine, although subject to some narrow defenses, permits
avoidance of any contract entered into by a minor. Avoidance is permitted
throughout minority and for a reasonable time after reaching adulthood, so
long as the minor has not ratified the contract as an adult.15 Disaffirmance
does require that the minor return any benefit received as consideration on
the contract, to the extent it is still in the minor’s possession.16 In most
jurisdictions, the minor is also entitled to restitution of the consideration
already conferred on the adult pursuant to the contract.17 In a dozen states,
the adult has a right to offset the depreciation of the consideration from the
amount paid back to the minor.18 But in most states, the minor is entitled to
repayment without deduction.
11. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (2006) (describing
“clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22
n.4 (2d Cir. 2002) (using “clickwrap”).
12. Maybe we will soon see a court using “cookiewrap.” For an explanation of how cookies can
be implicated as contracts, see Max Stul Oppenheimer, Consent Revisited, 12 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3
(2010) (explaining how cookies have capabilities to accept terms automatically).
13. For a more complete discussion of wrap contracts and the trends in judicial enforcement, see
Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browseraps: How
the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. (forthcoming
2012).
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:17; BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: CASES,
DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 422 (2003). For additional discussion of the infancy doctrine
generally and the necessities exception, see Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy
Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 47 (2012).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. c (1981).
17. See, e.g., Webster St. P’ship, Ltd. v. Sheridan, 368 N.W.2d 439, 444 (Neb. 1985) (holding
that upon disaffirmance of the lease, the adult was required to refund to the minors the entire amount
of the lease and the security deposit, even though the adult had no right of offset for the value to the
minors of occupying the apartment).
18. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:16 (“Although the weight of authority still permits an infant
buyer to recover the price paid merely upon offering to return the property, if any, remaining in her
hands, without accounting to the seller for its depreciation or its use, there is an increasing number of
jurisdictions that allow the seller to deduct for such depreciation and use.”); id. at n.13 (listing
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Online markets are increasingly dependent on minors.19 With the threat
of the infancy doctrine, one would think merchants would be extremely
reluctant to deal with minors for any transaction that is not de minimus or for
food, clothing, or shelter (and even then, most minors providing these goods
for themselves are not providing “necessities”).20 And yet, the lure of profits
appears to have overcome the fear of legal disaffirmance, at least so far. But
the infancy doctrine cannot be dismissed as an insignificant risk. Once
minors, and their parents, catch on to the fact that the legislatures of almost
every state and the vast majority of courts still strictly affirm the doctrine,
the impact on businesses targeted largely at minors may be severe.21
As I discuss elsewhere,22 the emergence of a significant market relying
on unemancipated teens to consume purely discretionary goods and services,
and various other changes in the way we think about teens, may warrant a
serious reassessment of the infancy doctrine and its existing exceptions. The
doctrine may be unwarranted when asserted by a minor to evade the
payment of a standard, publicized price in a part of the market that is truly
competitive and for which information is readily available. But this does not
mean the doctrine need be thrown out entirely. Any reassessment must be
thoughtful and limited unless and until we have current evidence
establishing that minors no longer need some or all of the doctrine’s
protections or that the doctrine is being regularly abused. Such a
reassessment must be sensitive to context and consider whether changes in
the infancy doctrine should be undertaken first with brick-and-mortar
transactions or TOS, and whether changes should be experimental and
incremental or encompassing. At this point, the infancy doctrine is the law,
and it is one mechanism for encouraging online businesses to reign in their
greed both in targeting children and in catching all users with hidden,
overreaching contract terms.
With the exception of older hornbooks and collations,23 a few cursory
mentions of the doctrine in practitioner guides, and brief summaries of
infancy doctrine implications in other fields of law—such as the juvenile

twelve states that allow depreciation deductions). The depreciation offset applicable in some states
is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 94–103.
19. The spending power of teens is discussed infra Part IV.A.
20. See Julie Cromer Young, From the Mouths of Babes: Protecting Child Authors from
Themselves, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 431, 457 (2010) (“Because most services do not meet the category
of necessity or other unavoidable contract, courts have allowed minors to disaffirm their contracts
for services.”).
21. The reasons why the infancy doctrine is currently underused, and the potentialities that will
bring it to the forefront, are discussed in Preston & Crowther, supra note 15.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., 43 C.J.S. Infants § 209 (2004); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 74 (2010); JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS §§ 8.1–.8 (6th ed. 2009); WILLISTON, supra note
2, §§ 9:1–:25.
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justice system and criminal culpability,24 immigration and asylum for
minors,25 and medical consent26—very few sources devote more than a
footnote to the infancy doctrine. Of the publications that treat the infancy
doctrine with more than a perfunctory summary, most are student or recent
graduate work. Very few are scholarly engagements primarily aimed at
infancy doctrine theory and application. Even then, the student and faculty
treatments in the last decade are of limited usefulness, a matter discussed in
detail below.27 This article provides solid foundations for a discussion of
where the doctrine fits, in the face of a rising youth market and the digital
revolution. This article considers the implications of the extant infancy
doctrine in the online context.
Part II.A covers the general parameters of the infancy doctrine. Part
II.B dispels the notion that the doctrine will not be applicable to online
services once the service has been used or consumed. This subpart critiques
the primary analysis of the one case that has addressed the infancy doctrine
in the online arena—A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC.28 Although this case appears
to create or expand an infancy doctrine defense based on the use of benefits,
the court misapplies the law. Part II.C addresses a possible secondary
explanation of iParadigms and the seemingly eternal question of whether the
infancy doctrine can be used as a sword, whatever that means in various
jurisdictions and contexts. Any suggestion that such a restriction eviscerates
the doctrine’s application is singularly unfounded. Part II.D explores
another infancy doctrine defense that apparently is providing false comfort
to some online merchants. This defense is based on a fraudulent
misrepresentation of age. The mere recital of adulthood is unlikely to
provide any support for the assertion of this defense and OSPs take no
further steps to require verification. Part II.E tackles the only other basis
commonly raised for suggesting the infancy doctrine does not or should not
apply online. It describes why a minor’s advanced technical skills are not
relevant to the policies of the infancy doctrine and, in fact, might emphasize
the minor’s lack of caution in making legal commitments online.
24. See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Minor Discrepancies: Forging a Common Understanding of
Adolescent Competence in Healthcare Decision-Making and Criminal Responsibility, 58 JUV. &
FAM. CT. J., Summer 2007, at 1, 2.
25. See Charles H. Kuck & Grace Kennedy, Children in Immigration Proceedings, in
LEXISNEXIS EXPERT COMMENTARIES 3–4 (2007).
26. See Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Minor Restrictions: Adolescence Across
Legal Disciplines (forthcoming).
27. See infra notes 41–51 and accompanying text.
28. 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel.
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
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Part III focuses on the peculiarities of online contracting. Part III.A
briefly provides context for the current state of contract law doctrine and the
increasing laxity in maintaining traditional protections against falling
unintentionally into serious contractual burdens. Part III.B reviews the
major objections to enforcing many TOS and assesses whether other
contract doctrines provide sufficient basis for policing the abuses of TOS.
This subpart concludes that, if the infancy doctrine needs to be limited to
better accommodate current market needs, the online TOS is not the best
place to begin.
Part IV predicts the collision of the infancy doctrine and a market ever
more greedy to engage minors. Part IV.A addresses minors’ economic
power, whether online businesses are less at risk because they do not take
cash, and the extent to which a parent or other entity secondarily guarantees
the payment of online financial promises or reimbursement for money
refunded to a minor under the infancy doctrine. Part IV.B considers the
more subtle economic costs associated with minors’ ability to avoid contract
terms even if the service is free or the right to payment is not challenged.
Part IV.C outlines the options available to online businesses and offers
recommendations for how OSPs could and should respond to an upswing in
infancy doctrine claims.
II. PORTING INFANCY DOCTRINE INTO CYBERSPACE
To date there has been no successful campaign to devise a new body of
contract law for cyberspace.29 Generally, courts attempt to apply the same
principles and doctrines when considering online contracts that apply
elsewhere, although the context of the Internet and electronic goods and

29. The highlights of the somewhat tortured interchange on the issue of whether the Internet
should be governed by a “new” body of cyberlaw, rather than by existing real-world law applied by
analogy, are laid out by Ann Bartow in a recent book review. Ann Bartow, A Portrait of the Internet
as a Young Man, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1079, 1098–100 (2010) (reviewing JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008)). In short, after an extensive debate on the
question between David Johnson and David Post, Judge Easterbrook made a parody of the concept
of a cyber-specific “law,” which spurred a cottage industry of disputing and defending the point (and
insulting each other) involving Larry Lessig, Declan McCullagh, David Post, Jack Goldsmith, Marc
Rotenberg, and Steve Bryant. Id. (citing David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and
the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); David G. Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 231 (1999);
David G. Post, What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1439 (2000); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy: (What
Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 n.*, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/
01_STLR_1; Steve Bryant, What Larry Doesn’t Get, README (May 4, 2003),
http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/ReadMe/article.php%3Fid=141.html; and others).
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services does suggest some additional concerns. This part begins with a
brief overview of the infancy doctrine. I then address the four issues most
pertinent to the intersection of the infancy doctrine and online contracts.
First, I dissect the ruling in A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC,30 a case involving an
online TOS that is regularly cited as providing a path around the doctrine.
Second, I dispel the notion that the maxim—the infancy doctrine cannot be
used as a sword—gives a judge the right to override any of the established
elements of the doctrine. Third, I explain why OSPs may not avert
application of the infancy doctrine by a recital of age buried in a TOS. And,
finally, I consider how a minor’s technological skills figure into the
calculation required by the infancy doctrine.
A. Infancy in a Byte
The infancy doctrine,31 the notion that a person who enters into a
contract while under legal age may later void the contract, can be traced to
the fifteenth century,32 if not earlier. The continued application of the
doctrine is based on the presumption that minors are generally more
vulnerable to exploitation than adults and less capable of comprehending the
nature of the legal obligations associated with a contract.33 For ease of
administration and clarity in application, the rule was settled with a

30. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473.
31. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.4 (4th ed. 2004); PERILLO, supra
note 23, §§ 8.2–.8; JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 24 (4th ed. 2001). See
also Melvin John Dugas, Comment, The Contractual Capacity of Minors: A Survey of the Prior Law
and the New Articles, 62 TUL. L. REV. 745, 746–54 (1988) (providing a detailed discussion of early
developments of infancy protections in French and Roman law and how these principles became
incorporated into Louisiana law).
32. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:2.
33. City of New York v. Stringfellow’s of N.Y., Ltd., 684 N.Y.S.2d 544 (App. Div. 1999).
Infancy, since common-law times and most likely long before, is a legal disability and an
infant, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is universally considered to be lacking
in judgment, since his or her normal condition is that of incompetency. In addition, an
infant is deemed to lack the adult’s knowledge of the probable consequences of his or her
acts or omissions and the capacity to make effective use of such knowledge as he or she
has. It is the policy of the law to look after the interests of infants, who are considered
incapable of looking after their own affairs, to protect them from their own folly and
improvidence, and to prevent adults from taking advantage of them.
Id. at 550–51. In this case, an adult establishment attempted to skirt the city’s zoning ordinances by
allowing children to enter if they signed a waiver releasing the establishment from any liability for
any damage caused to them by viewing uncovered female breasts. Id. at 550.
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categorical age line without regard to whether any particular individual is
mature or infantile.34
Generally, the operation of the doctrine is straightforward, although
subject to a few defenses. I more thoroughly explain the doctrine’s nuances
elsewhere.35 Here, I briefly overview the defenses that could be applicable
to the enforcement of TOS and, in the next two subparts, I illustrate two
issues of the doctrine’s application in the context of a significant recent case.
The most widely applicable defense to the infancy doctrine is that the
contract provided necessities for the minor. Social networking, music
downloads, and e-mail accounts are not necessities (. . . at least not yet).
Additionally, even items that would normally be considered necessities may
not qualify because most teens with computer access can rely on parental
financial support. Under the doctrine, if minors could have food, clothing,
medical care, and other necessities provided by a parent, it is not essential
for them to contract to survive, and thus, there is no need to immunize adults
who contract with them.36 Even if the adult party to the contract
successfully asserts the defense of necessities, the historical rule provides
that the minor must then pay the quantum meruit value of the consideration
the minor received under the contract; it does not reinstate the contract for
all purposes.37
The emancipation defense only applies if the minor is married, in the
military, or kicked out of both parents’ homes.38 Although rarely applicable,
this defense could serve to bind some minors to a contract made online if the
OSP could establish these facts. However, this defense does not provide
much advance protection for OSPs. Determining emancipation prior to
online contracting is difficult unless the OSP is willing to ask for marriage
data or enlistment status before contracting, which would likely be deemed
invasive. As a result, OSPs should not assume this defense will protect
them.
The “retains benefit” defense is an attempt to mitigate the economic loss
of the contracting adult. In most jurisdictions this defense means that to be
entitled to void the contract a minor must return any consideration still in the
minor’s possession.39 But courts have found that returning damaged or used

34.
26.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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consideration, such as a wrecked car or half-used goods, is sufficient.40
Thus, while a minor seeking to void an online TOS will no longer be
allowed to use the service, the fact that the minor has benefited from the
service in the past is not grounds to prevent voiding the contract.
An adult who relies in good faith on a reasonable investigation of the
other party’s age may, in some states, assert fraudulent misrepresentation of
age as a defense,41 and, in other states, bring an action in tort for fraud.42 But
even in jurisdictions that allow the defense, generally by statute, it has been
limited to instances of bad faith or active misrepresentation on the part of the
minor.43 Additionally, to qualify for this defense, adults have a duty to
investigate sufficiently so they can then rely in good faith and reasonably.44
This is because the policies of the infancy doctrine presuppose that adults
know that minors have incentives to lie about their age, especially online
where they perceive themselves as anonymous. Many TOS include,
somewhere in the middle of their dense legalese, a statement that the user is
age eighteen or older, or of legal age. The use and actual effectiveness of
such a representation in creating good faith and reasonable reliance are
discussed in greater detail in Part II.D below.
In rare and exceptional cases, courts have found that the conduct of a
minor sinks to the level of bad faith that precludes use of the infancy
doctrine. For instance, a minor’s disaffirmance of a contract for the benefit
of a third party is not in good faith and bars application of the doctrine.45
Malicious destruction of the consideration or an unnecessary act done out of
spite or to punish the adult would also qualify as bad faith. In this sense, the
doctrine requires clean hands in the process of entering and voiding the
contract. An example is Rivera v. Reading Housing Authority,46 where the
court held that this principle forbids minors from using infancy “to practice
40. See, e.g., Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 563–64, 567 (Wis. 1980) (finding that a
minor who disaffirmed a contract and returned a damaged car to the seller was not liable for the
damage to the car or any depreciation in value).
41. See, e.g., Nichols v. English, 154 S.E.2d 239 (Ga. 1967); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 101
(2010).
42. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:22; see also Royal Fin. Co. v. Schaefer, 330 S.W.2d 129, 130
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (“[A]n infant who induces another to contract with him by misrepresenting that
he is of age to the adult’s resulting injury, is liable in tort.”).
43. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 151 (2004).
44. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-103 (West 2010) (“No contract can be thus disaffirmed in
cases where, on account of the minor’s own misrepresentations as to his majority . . . the other party
had good reasons to believe the minor capable of contracting.” (emphasis added)).
45. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 225 (2004) (“The right to disaffirm will not be extended beyond the
required limits, and it is not given to be exercised for the advantage of others than the infant.”).
46. 819 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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unconscionable business methods,” such as voiding an employment contract
in order to compete with an employer.47 This exception is discussed in Part
II.E below. But very few cases raise a bad faith defense.
This article does not purport to address every nuance of the infancy
doctrine and every emerging trend,48 but rather only those pertinent to the
typical online contract. Some other context-specific defenses to the infancy
doctrine seem to be emerging in some states. These include defenses to a
minor’s attempt to avoid a waiver given as a condition for participation in
children’s recreational sports sponsored by volunteers,49 and perhaps an
attempt to avoid an arbitration provision in a contract for necessary medical
treatment.50 Some states are also beginning to make an exception to the
infancy doctrine in the context of a contract for the minor’s employment.51
While an employment contract is unlikely to arise from a TOS, this
exception is discussed below in another context.52
Certainly, the infancy doctrine can often produce dramatic results. The
original infancy doctrine has over time become subject to the foregoing
exceptions and defenses to mitigate the perceived harshness of its result in
some situations, the lack of sympathy engendered by some minors’ conduct,
and the doctrine’s obviously arbitrary age cutoff.53 The next section
considers whether, without substantial legislative and judicial changes, any
basis exists to suspect that the doctrine is not as potent online as it is in faceto-face transactions.
B. iParadigms and the “I Keep Benefits” Defense
Some are citing a recent case, A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC,54 as having cast
doubts on the continued applicability of the infancy doctrine—at least with
47. Id. at 1331–32 (quoting Pankas v. Bell, 198 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. 1964)).
48. For a more thorough discussion of infancy doctrine nuances, see Preston & Crowther, supra
note 15.
49. See, e.g., Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998).
50. See, e.g., Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965); Leong ex rel. Leong v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 788 P.2d 164, 169 (Haw. 1990).
51. See, e.g., Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D.
Ill. 1997); Douglass v. Pfleuger Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129 (Haw. 2006).
52. See infra Part II.C.
53. “There is . . . a modern trend among the states, either by judicial action or by statute, in the
approach to the problem of balancing the rights of minors against those of innocent merchants.”
Dodson ex rel. Dodson v. Shrader, 824 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1992). The court goes on to say that
evidence of this trend is found in the development of two defenses: (1) “[U]pon rescission, recovery
of the full purchase price is subject to a deduction for the minor’s use of the merchandise,” and (2)
“[T]he minor’s recovery of the full purchase price is subject to a deduction for the minor’s ‘use’ of
the consideration he or she received under the contract, or for the ‘depreciation’ or ‘deterioration’ of
the consideration in his or her possession.” Id. at 547–48.
54. 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel.
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
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respect to contracts for online services.55 The Virginia district court’s
language in the case suggests that a minor who uses the benefit of services
prior to attempting to avoid the contract cannot then assert the infancy
doctrine.56 The idea is that even kids cannot have their cake and eat it too.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit evaded its responsibility to fully articulate the
district court’s misapplication of the infancy doctrine’s exception for failure
to return benefits by finding that the district court’s holding made full
analysis of the infancy doctrine issue unnecessary.57 However, the circuit
court’s footnote evidences that the cursory declaration of the district court
was not supported by the authority it cited.58
In iParadigms, four high school students sued iParadigms for copyright
infringement of their work submitted through iParadigms’ anti-plagiarism
software, Turnitin.59 Each of the students attended (or claimed to attend)
schools that required students to submit their papers through Turnitin, which
then produced plagiarism reports for the teachers.60 In addition, the schools
had authorized Turnitin to archive the student submissions to be part of an
ever-growing database against which to check future papers for plagiarism.61
Each of the students created a profile, finishing with a click on “‘I Agree’ to
the terms of the ‘user agreement’ (also referred to as the ‘Clickwrap
Agreement’).”62 This TOS included an astonishingly sweeping waiver:
55. Michael G. Bennett, The Edge of Ethics in iParadigms, 2009 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F.
6, at 3, http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/12-iptf-Bennett.pdf (explaining that the judge
in this case relied on an exception to the infancy doctrine that bars a minor from taking “the
contract’s benefits while leaving behind its burdens”); Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 434 (“In
[A.V. v. iParadigms] the court created an opinion that not only had immediate analytical impact for
the contractual doctrine of infancy, but also had a more subtle, lasting impact on how courts are to
interpret the terms and conditions of sites.”); see also Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds,
Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2007–2008, 64 BUS. LAW. 199,
211–12 (2008) (In A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, “[t]he court had no trouble rejecting the [infancy
doctrine]. [T]he minor cannot accept the benefits of the contract without also bearing its
burdens . . . . Because plaintiffs had benefitted from their use of defendant’s product (they had, after
all, satisfied their school paper requirements), they must accept any burdens imposed by the Clickwrap Agreement.”); Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A
Useful Vestige, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 620 (2011) (discussing iParadigms as an example that
“courts are increasingly reluctant to disaffirm contracts” on the basis of infancy).
56. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481–82.
57. iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 636 n.5.
58. See infra text accompanying note 71.
59. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
60. Id. at 478.
61. Id.
62. Id. Oddly enough, in addition to this TOS, iParadigms’ website had another “Usage Policy,”
even though the original TOS discussed in the text purported by its terms to be the “the entire
agreement between the user and iParadigms’ with respect to usage of this web site.” Id. at 479, 484–
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In no event shall iParadigms, LLC and/or its suppliers be liable for
any direct, indirect, punitive, incidental, special, or consequential
damages arising out of or in any way connected with the use of this
web site or with the delay or inability to use this web site, or for any
information, software, products, and services obtained through this
web site, or otherwise arising out of the use of this web site, whether
based in contract, tort, strict liability or otherwise, even if
iParadigms, inc. or any of its suppliers has been advised of the
possibility of damages.63
The minors added written disclaimers on the copy of their submitted
works, indicating they did not consent to the archiving of the works by
Turnitin.64 Turnitin continued to archive the students’ works and the
students brought an action through adult representatives.65
Among other arguments, the students sought to void the terms of the
TOS by asserting the infancy doctrine.66 The district court rejected this
argument, declaring:
In Virginia, a contract with an infant is voidable by the infant upon
attaining the age of majority. See Zelnick v. Adams, 263 Va. 601,
608, 561 S.E.2d 711 (2002) . . . . However, the infancy defense
cannot function as “a sword to be used to the injury of others,
although the law intends it simply as a shield to protect the infant
from injustice and wrong.” MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 701,
17 S. Ct. 961, 42 L. Ed. 326 (1897). In other words, “[i]f an infant
enters into any contract subject to conditions or stipulations, he
cannot take the benefit of the contract without the burden of the

85. The court found the second Usage Policy unenforceable because it was not visible to users
during account creation and it did not require a click or other indication of assent. Id. at 485. The
court refused to accept the argument that this agreement became binding as a “browsewrap” when
the minors used the Turnitin program. Id. at 484–85.
63. Id. at 478. The waiver in the iParadigms’ TOS might have been challenged on
unconscionability grounds. It purports to waive liability for every action or inaction and does not
exclude from its range intentional or recklessly negligent torts of its own employees. Not all courts
look kindly on a blanket waiver of any responsibility to the other party to the contract. See, e.g.,
Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709, 712 (Idaho 1979) (“[It is] well
established that courts look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability [blanket waiver of
liability provisions] and construe such provisions strictly against the person relying on them,
especially when that person is the preparer of the document.” (citing Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seabord
Sur. Co., 318 P.2d 84 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Talley v. Skelly Oil Co., 433 P.2d 425 (Kan. 1967);
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Sec. Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959))).
64. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 480–81.
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conditions or stipulations.” 5 Williston on Contracts § 9:14 (4th ed.
2007).67
The court then held that the students could not void the contract and
retain the two “benefits” of using Turnitin: a “grade from their teachers” and
the “standing to bring the present suit” granted by the TOS.68
On appeal,69 the Fourth Circuit avoided directly touching upon the
infancy doctrine issue, stating: “In light of our ‘fair use’ analysis, we decline
to address the question of whether the terms of the Clickwrap Agreement
created an enforceable contract between plaintiffs and iParadigms.”70 This
sentence is supported by footnote five, which says,
[T]he district court refused to void the contract based on the
doctrine of infancy, see Zelnick v. Adams, 263 Va. 601, 561 S.E.2d
711, 715 (2002) (“[A] contract with an infant is not void, only
voidable by the infant upon attaining the age of majority.”),
concluding that plaintiffs cannot use this doctrine as a “sword” to
void a contract while retaining the benefits of the contract—high
school credit and standing to bring this action, cf. 5 Richard A.
Lord, Williston on Contracts § 9.14 (4th ed.) (“When the infant has
received consideration which he still possesses, . . . he cannot, upon
reaching majority, keep it and refuse to pay.”)71
Like the district court, the Fourth Circuit cited Zelnick for the
application of the infancy doctrine in Virginia. However, the Fourth Circuit
omitted any reference to the 1897 case cited by the district court that uses
the “sword” language, which is discussed further in the next subpart. The
court then relied on the same Williston section cited by the district court.
Note, however, that the signal used by the Fourth Circuit before the
Williston cite is cf. In addition, the Fourth Circuit includes as a parenthetical
an excerpt from Williston that is more complete than the language cited by
the district court. According to The Bluebook, a cf. signal means that the
“[c]ited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition
but sufficiently analogous to lend support.”72 The Fourth Circuit’s use of a
67. Id. at 481.
68. Id.
69. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
70. Id. at 645 n.8.
71. Id. at 636 n.5.
72. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 55 (Columbia Law Review
Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
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cf. signal here suggests that the Williston source differs from the conclusion
of the district court. In fact, the Williston section does differ.73 The section
later clarifies that, if the minor no longer possesses any tangible returnable
consideration, the “taking the benefit” defense fails.74 The cited Williston
section contains no hint of an expanded meaning such as the “sword”
language quoted from the 1897 case by the district court.75
The infancy doctrine, in virtually every jurisdiction,76 only requires the
minor to return any “consideration that he or she still possesses.”77
Additionally, the benefits iterated by the district court do not even qualify as
consideration given by iParadigms.78 The first benefit the students received,
the benefit of getting a grade from their teachers and schools, was not given
by iParadigms, and thus the benefit was not consideration given by
iParadigms in the transaction sought to be voided.79 The second benefit
noted by the district court, standing to sue, has never been conceptualized as
consideration for a contract.80 Moreover, in this case, “if there was no user
agreement, [the] students would still have standing to sue for copyright
infringement.”81
If we apply the “taking the benefit” defense to TOS for e-mail accounts,
the benefit—using the service to communicate—would no doubt be
terminated with respect to future use if the minor disaffirmed the TOS, but
then there would seem to be nothing tangible to “return” from past service.
Some jurisdictions go further and allow the infancy doctrine to be used in
certain situations to punish the adult for entering the contract.82 In these
cases, the minor is allowed to disaffirm the contract without even returning
any consideration he or she still possesses.83

73. See WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:14.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. A few jurisdictions have statutorily required that an infant is liable for the depreciation of the
goods to be returned under a disaffirmed contract. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 91 (2010). See, e.g.,
Sec. Bank v. McEntire, 300 S.W.2d 588 (Ark. 1957); Toon v. Mack Int’l Motor Truck Corp., 262 P.
51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927); Barber v. Gross, 51 N.W.2d 696 (S.D. 1952). The offset for depreciation is
further discussed infra Part II.C.
77. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:14.
78. Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 455–57 (arguing that the benefit of receiving a grade from
the school would not qualify under the infancy doctrine); Stephen Sharon, Comment, Do Students
Turn Over Their Rights When They Turn in Their Papers? A Case Study of Turnitin.com, 26 TOURO
L. REV. 207, 215–16 (2010).
79. Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 457.
80. Id. at 456. Cromer Young further argues that “standing to sue” cannot be the consideration
for a contract because it is “implicit in the formation of a contract.” Id.
81. Sharon, supra note 78, at 215–16.
82. Daniel, supra note 7, at 256 (citing Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Wis. 1980);
Weisbrook v. Clyde C. Netzley, Inc., 374 N.E.2d 1102, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)).
83. Id.
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After making quick work of dismissing the infancy doctrine, the district
court directs most of its efforts to an alternative theory for its holding—that
the retention of the shadow file of the students’ papers was fair use under the
copyright laws.84 This is also where the Fourth Circuit directs its attention,
also at some length.85 Instead of directly addressing whether the contract
was voidable under the infancy doctrine, which, if true, would have been a
simple, straightforward way to resolve the case, both courts spent
considerable effort to reach the alternate and more credible holding on fair
use.86
Other aspects of the district court’s iParadigms opinion, and the facts of
the case, suggest that the court’s reasoning would not necessarily translate to
other cases, in any event. The district court stresses the inherent ability of a
school district to detect and respond to plagiarism, noting that a school can
restrict the First Amendment rights of a student in a way that would be
unconstitutional with respect to an adult.87
The district court’s comments on the infancy doctrine, in this context,
may be interpreted as dicta. But even if taken literally, the district court’s
conclusion misapprehends the retained benefit exception to the infancy
doctrine. Reliance on this case as a basis to deny minors a right to avoid a
TOS is unfounded.
C. iParadigms, eSwords,88 and the Black Hat Defense
The district court in iParadigms further justified its dismissal of the
infancy doctrine by saying that the infancy doctrine may not be used as a
sword.89 The court did not elaborate on what uses are swordlike, but the
tenor of the language suggests that the court may have thought that the
infancy doctrine cannot be used to take rights away from adults. But, absent
84. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
85. iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 638–45.
86. Id.; iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
87. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)). The
district court relies on Morse, the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” case, where the Supreme Court went as
far as it ever has in respecting some speech rights for minors. Thus, even Morse acknowledges the
presumption that free speech concerns are circumscribed when dealing with minors. Morse, 551
U.S. at 403. Moreover, the circuits have, since Morse, been reluctant to apply the liberalization
portended in Morse outside of its narrow facts. See, e.g., B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554
F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2009).
88. I credit this term to an online ministry: Rick Meyers, eSword: The Sword of the Lord with an
Electronic Edge, ESWORD, http://www.e-sword.net/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
89. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
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a defense or exception, the adult’s right to enforce a contract always falls to
the infancy doctrine.
All the minors sought to do with the infancy doctrine in iParadigms was
avoid the TOS contract containing the overreaching waiver.90 A review of
other cases using sword language in the context of the infancy doctrine
sheds light on the iParadigms court’s treatment of the infancy doctrine.
Discussions about the infancy doctrine frequently employ metaphors of
shields and swords.91 The concept is typically cited to a few very early cases
that first associated the doctrine with a sword.92 The principle from these
cases still applies as far as it is interpreted correctly.93 However, courts and
commentators have inconsistent and unsupportable visions about what using
the doctrine “as a sword” means in legal terms. The language in iParadigms
provides an excellent illustration of this opaque treatment.
One of these principal cases using sword language is a 1920 case, Pettit
v. Liston.94 It identifies the minor’s status as a plaintiff as one factor in
limiting the right of the minor to recoup all the consideration previously paid
to the adult.95 In Pettit, the minor was allowed to void the contract and the
minor returned the consideration he still possessed, a used motorcycle, to the
adult.96 The court, however, limited the minor’s recovery of money he had
already paid to the adult by an amount equal to the depreciation in the value
of the motorcycle to prevent the minor from using his infancy as a sword.97

90. Id. at 478.
91. See, e.g., id. at 481; Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp.
150, 153 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National
Letter of Intent: A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1275, 1330 n.209 (1989);
Cunningham, supra note 7, at 294; Daniel, supra note 7, at 256; Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing
the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
481, 485 (1994); John R. San Fellipo, Jr., Oregon’s Telephone Information Delivery Service Law: A
Consumer Protection Step Too Far, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 455, 473–74 (1992); Rhonda Gay
Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1302
(2000); D. Ross Martin, Note, Conspiratorial Children? The Intersection of the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act and Federal Conspiracy Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 859, 892 n.202 (1994).
92. See, e.g., iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 481 (citing MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688
(1897)); Cozzillio, supra note 91, at 1330 n.209 (citing Rice v. Butler, 55 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y.
1899); Pettit v. Liston, 191 P. 660, 661 (Or. 1920)); Daniel, supra note 7, at 256 n.135 (citing Rice,
55 N.E. at 276); DiMatteo, supra note 91, at 485 n.20 (citing Zouch v. Parsons, (1765) 3 Burr. 1794
(K.B.)).
93. See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 225 (2004) (“An infant’s right to avoid or disaffirm a contract made
during infancy is absolute and unconditional; however, infancy acts as a shield and not a sword.”).
94. Pettit, 191 P. at 661.
95. Id. at 662 (“We must not be understood as deciding at this time what would be the rule
where the vendor is seeking to enforce an executory contract against the minor, which is a different
question not necessarily involved in this case.”).
96. Id. at 660.
97. Id. at 662. Professor Cozzillio uses sword language in precisely the same way. Cozzillio,
supra note 91, at 1330 n.209. He ties the use of sword language to the minor’s position as a
plaintiff, but being a plaintiff does not deprive the minor of the ability to use the doctrine to
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Similarly, an 1899 case, Rice v. Butler,98 uses sword language to explain a
holding that reaches the same result as Pettit, but omits any link with the
minor’s status as plaintiff. 99 The Rice court required the minor “to offset the
depreciation in value of the bicycle from the payments he had made.”100 The
existence of an offset rule, and the holdings in both these cases, actually
affirm that the minor can use the infancy doctrine to escape enforcement of
the contract. Thus, use as a sword describes a minor’s attempt to demand
return of the full price paid upon return of the consideration, although the
consideration has been damaged or suffered a loss in value.
A dozen jurisdictions now apply this rule and allow an offset of the
depreciation against the cash the adult must return to the minor upon
disaffirmance.101 In Williston, the offset rule is acknowledged as a minority
exception to the full restitution generally permitted, but it is not associated
with sword language. Williston says:
Although the weight of authority still permits an infant buyer to
recover the price paid merely upon offering to return the property, if
any, remaining in her hands, without accounting to the seller for its
depreciation or its use, there [are] an increasing number of
jurisdictions that allow the seller to deduct for such depreciation and
use.102

disaffirm. Pettit, 191 P. at 662. Rather, when the minor is a plaintiff the court may require more
than simply returning whatever consideration in is the minor’s possession in whatever condition. Id.
98. 55 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1899).
99. Id. at 275–76.
100. Brian A. Darst, Speech at the Federal Publications Seminar: Basics of Commercial
Contracting 6 (2007), available at BCC GLASS-CLE 1 (Westlaw) (summarizing the facts in Rice);
see also Scott Eden Mgmt. v. Kavovit, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1990). Requiring full
restitution from the adult without any offset for benefits already used and unreturnable would put the
infant “in a position superior to that which he would have occupied had he never entered into the
contract with plaintiff.” Id. Retaining an advantage from the repudiated transaction is “using the
privilege of infancy as a sword rather than a shield.” Id. Justice and fairness require a minor “to
account for . . . reasonable use or deterioration in value” of an item upon disaffirmance. W.E.
Shipley, Annotation, Infant’s Liability for Use or Depreciation of Subject Matter, in Action to
Recover Purchase Price upon His Disaffirmance of Contract to Purchase Goods, 12 A.L.R.3d 1174
(1967) (citing Rice, 55 N.E. at 276).
101. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:16.
102. Id. (listing cases from twelve jurisdictions, with the most recent case decided in 1992); see
also Olson v. Veum, 222 N.W. 233, 233–34 (Wis. 1928) (“To sustain the judgment below is to
overlook the substantial distinction between a mere denial by an infant of contract liability where the
other party is seeking to enforce it and those cases where he, who was the minor, not only disaffirms
such contract, but seeks the aid of the court to restore to him that with which he has parted at the
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However, the offset rule does not apply widely, and it never applies
beyond the amount of cash the adult would otherwise have to return. If the
depreciation is greater than what the minor has paid, the adult may keep the
amount paid, but cannot seek further reimbursement.103 The minors in
iParadigms did not ask for the return of any cash or other consideration, and
so could not be subject to an offset.104 Thus, this interpretation of using
infancy as a sword could have no meaning in this case.
Sword language has also become associated with whether the minor is
the plaintiff in the case.105 This interpretation developed because the court in
Pettit mentions the minor’s status as plaintiff, and because the minor in Rice
was also the plaintiff, although the Rice court does not tie that to its
holding.106 Some current literature continues to link sword language to the
notion that a minor may not use the doctrine as a plaintiff, but then
acknowledges that such a rule no longer exists. For instance, Professor
Daniel states:
Although the minority incapacity doctrine was initially intended to
be used only as a shield and not as a sword, in many cases this is a
distinction without a difference. Generally, it is acknowledged that
a minor may institute an action to disaffirm a contract and is not
relegated to using his minority status as a defense.107
Daniel cites Rice, but recall the consequence for using the doctrine as a
sword in Rice was only the application of the offset rule. Plaintiff or not, the
minors in Pettit and Rice were allowed to disaffirm.108 Another example of
this interpretation appears in Professor Hartman’s statement that “the power
of disaffirmance constitutes both a sword and shield, as it may be used either

making of the contract. In the one case he is using his infancy merely as a shield, in the other also as
a sword.”).
103. Pettit v. Liston, 191 P. 660, 661–62 (Or. 1920).
104. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
105. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cooper, Note, Naked Before the Law: Reality Porn and the Capacity
to Contract, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 353, 377 (2005) (“[C]ourts have had trouble with cases
where a minor sues to dissolve a contract instead of using it as a defense.”). To support this idea, the
student author cites Zouch v. Parsons, (1765) 3 Burr. 1794 (K.B.), which provides that “[a] third rule
deducible from the nature of the [infancy] privilege, which is given as a shield, and not as a sword, is
that it never shall be turned into an offensive weapon of fraud and injustice,” which does not lend
much support to a plaintiff/defendant distinction. Id. at 1802 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See Rice v. Butler, 55 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1899); Pettit, 191 P. 660.
107. Daniel, supra note 7, at 256.
108. See Rice, 55 N.E. 275; Pettit, 191 P. 660.
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defensively or offensively.”109 Hartman cites Monahan v. Friederick for this
truism, but it is a case which makes no reference to swords or shields.110
Although there is minimal support for the idea that sword language ever
equated to a minor’s inability to use infancy as a plaintiff, there is some
sense that the plaintiff/defendant distinction might be relevant when
considering the minor’s obligations upon disaffirmance. The hornbook
Calamari and Perillo on Contracts specifically discusses this distinction and
states that that a minor who buys an item on credit and is then sued for nonpayment can disaffirm the contract and is only liable to return whatever
consideration he still possesses.111 On the other hand, a minor who pays
cash for the item and later seeks to disaffirm the contract and recover the
purchase price is entitled to recovery of consideration paid, but is required to
return the consideration he still possesses and the amount returned to the
minor is offset by any depreciation in the consideration returned.112
Calamari and Perillo on Contracts traces this plaintiff/defendant distinction
back to Rice and Pettit and cites a number of other cases that support the
offset rule.113 As discussed above, this depreciation rule does have support
in a number of jurisdictions; however, its use is tied to whether the minor is
seeking a return of consideration paid rather than whether the minor is a
plaintiff in the case. This confusion is understandable because in most
instances, a minor seeking a return of consideration paid would be a
plaintiff. The minors in iParadigms were plaintiffs; however, because the
sword language does not make a plaintiff/defendant distinction, and because
Virginia has not adopted the offset rule,114 this sword interpretation would
likewise be invalid had the district court intended this meaning.
Sword language, without reference to the offset rule or plaintiffs, does
show up occasionally in other infancy doctrine cases. In Sheller v. Frank’s
Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,115 the court refused to allow a minor employee to

109. Hartman, supra note 91, at 1302.
110. Monahan ex rel. Monahan v. Friederick, 455 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). While
Professors Daniel and Hartman make it clear that minors may use the infancy doctrine as plaintiffs,
Daniel appears to suggest this was the original meaning, and Hartman appears to tie the term
“sword” to offensive use as a plaintiff.
111. PERILLO, supra note 23, § 8.5(a).
112. Id. § 8.5(b).
113. Id. § 8.5(b) nn.10–11.
114. See WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:16 (the state jurisdictions that have accepted the offset
rule are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas).
115. 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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void the agreement to arbitrate contained in an employment contract.116 The
court stated that “‘the privilege of minority . . . is to be used as a shield and
not as a sword,’” and consequently that a “minor’s right to disaffirm in any
case ‘should be exercised with some regard to the rights of others, certainly
with as much regard to those rights as is fairly consistent with adequate
protection of the rights of the minor himself.’”117 The court does not
articulate what “adequate protection of the rights of the minor” is and, by
refusing the right to avoid in that case, the court seems to be giving no
protection to the minor. How broadly can the declaration of the Sheller case
be applied?
Another explanation for the Sheller holding is that it is one of several
courts who have recently recognized an exception to the infancy doctrine for
employment contracts.118 For instance, in Douglass v. Pflueger Hawaii,
Inc., the concurring judge stated that avoidance of the arbitration
requirement in the minor’s employment contract was not allowed because
infancy should not be used as a “sword to injure the defendants.”119 The
majority opinion,120 which makes no mention of swords, reasons that the
legislative grant permitting minors to be employed implies that minors
should have capacity to enter enforceable employment agreements.121 If
Sheller is not based on an employment exception, it appears to be simply
wrong.
Another example of a case using sword language to characterize another
element of a well-known exception to the infancy doctrine is State Farm

116. Id. at 153–54.
117. Id. at 153 (quoting Shepherd v. Shepherd, 97 N.E.2d 273, 282 (Ill. 1951)).
118. See, e.g., Robinson v. Food Serv. of Belton, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231 n.1 (D. Kan.
2005) (“[This] court does not believe that the Kansas Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, would
permit these plaintiffs to disaffirm their employment contracts when those contracts were, on the
whole, beneficial to those plaintiffs.”); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Captain D’s, LLC, No. CV04-281AA,
2005 WL 6141649 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2005) (upholding an arbitration provision in a minor’s
employment contract because thousands of Mississippi minors receive benefits of employment and
compensation dependent on such contracts). On an interlocutory appeal, the Mississippi Supreme
Court remanded the case for a full trial because the dispute in the case was outside the scope of the
arbitration agreement; consequently, the court did not address the infancy doctrine claim. Smith ex
rel. Smith v. Captain D’s, LLC, 963 So. 2d 1116 (Miss. 2007). See also Preston & Crowther, supra
note 15 (discussing the employment exception to the infancy doctrine more fully). But see Stroupes
v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 1:04-cv-133, 2005 WL 5610231, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2005)
(rejecting the concept of an employment exception to the infancy doctrine).
119. 135 P.3d 129, 148 (Haw. 2006) (Acoba, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 131–45 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 138 (“With respect to contracts of employment, it is apparent that, by relaxing the
requirements for sixteen—and seventeen-year-olds to obtain employment, the legislature clearly
viewed minors in this particular age group—being only one to two years from adulthood—as
capable and competent to contract for gainful employment and, therefore, should be bound by the
terms of such contracts.”).
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Skivington.122 The court held that the
sword principle does not allow a minor to unilaterally change a contract to
impose additional obligations on the other party.123 Rather, a minor must
“affirm or disaffirm the contract as a whole.”124 The minor purchased car
insurance, but rejected uninsured motorist coverage and then, after an
accident, wanted to disaffirm only the rejection of the uninsured coverage
and be compensated from that accident.125 This denial of a partial avoidance
and partial affirmance is an obvious result and is acknowledged in the
Williston section cited by the district court in iParadigms.126
Neither the Sheller nor the Skivington case sheds any light on what the
district court in iParadigms meant in repudiating use of the infancy doctrine
as a sword. If anything, these cases suggest that whenever a court is
applying an established defense, exception, or limit on the use of the infancy
doctrine, it may pull out the maxim about the doctrine not being used as a
sword, but such language does not seem to contain any substance beyond the
established parameters of the infancy doctrine. And none of these
parameters seem to apply in iParadigms.
There is one other possibility. Outside of the minority offset rule, the
most legitimate use of the sword metaphor seems tied to the situation where
the minor has acted in bad faith, as discussed above. In that situation, courts
appear unwilling to follow the literal rules of the infancy doctrine, and
instead apply equitable powers to circumvent traditional infancy rules while
still claiming that the infancy doctrine applies.127 In the ordinary case, the
right to use the doctrine to void the contract “is absolute and
unconditional,”128 and, in fact, “[t]he rule relating to the avoidance of
infants’ contracts should be liberally applied.”129 However, a court may
refuse to recognize the infancy doctrine when a minor’s conduct is
reprehensible. Is it possible that the district court in iParadigms was

122. 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 358 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1996).
123. Id. at 365–67.
124. Id. at 365.
125. Id. at 360.
126. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:14.
127. See, e.g., MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U.S. 688, 703 (1897) (minor was required to reimburse
adult where she borrowed money to pay off encumbrances on the property, even though the
consideration was technically no longer in the minor’s possession); Fifth Third Bank v. Gilbert, 478
N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Ohio Mun. 1984) (refusing to allow a minor to disaffirm unauthorized charges
she made with her father’s credit card because that would allow her to use infancy as a sword).
128. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 225 (2004).
129. Id.
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suggesting, with the sword language, that the minors in that case had gone so
far as to exhibit bad faith?
Professor Cromer Young suggests that the district court in iParadigms
may have been reacting to the perceived “bad actor status” of the
plaintiffs.130 Professor Cromer Young writes,
The iParadigms court may have reached the right conclusion due to
the bad-actor status of the minor authors—in this case involving
cheating and plagiarism, it is difficult to see what objection the
minors would have to the archiving of their works, unless they
believed that future submitted works would be flagged because they
raised alarming similarity to their works.131
But there is no evidence in the opinion that any of the minor plaintiffs in this
case plagiarized or were trying to escape the consequences of plagiarism. In
fact, one of the students submitted his work through Turnitin to a school he
did not attend,132 and thus the school could not have issued academic
sanctions against him in any event.
The plaintiffs’ attorney, Robert Arthur Vanderhye, who also served as
A.V.’s adult representative in the case, has brought at least one other case
against iParadigms.133 Comparing this other case to iParadigms suggests
that the motive in challenging the TOS in both cases was to obtain
compensation for iParadigms’ use of others’ works to build the database on
which the profitable business depends. The defendant’s brief asserts that
one of the parents and the attorney contrived the false submission to Turnitin
for the purpose of the suit and thus, in a premeditated manner, clicked to
accept the Usage Policy with no intention of abiding by it.134 Although this
fact may be true, and courts may associate bad faith with entering an

130. Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 458.
131. Id.
132. See A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479 (E.D. Va. 2008) (“[A.V.] used
Turnitin to submit his written work to the University of California, San Diego (‘UCSD’), an
educational institution in which A.V. was not enrolled.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. A.V.
ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
133. In Christen v. iParadigms, LLC, No. 1:10cv620, 2010 WL 3063137 (E.D. Va. Aug. 4,
2010), attorney Vanderhye attempted to use state law replevin, conversion, and unjust enrichment to
obtain compensation for students on whose work the profitable Turnitin depends. Id. at *3. The
plaintiff in Christen was an adult when the work was submitted and the case raises no infancy
doctrine issues. Id. at *1. The district court granted iParadigms’s motion to dismiss in Christen and
held that all the claims are preempted by the Copyright Act and the fair use holding from the earlier
Fourth Circuit case. Id. at *7–9.
134. iParadigms, LLC’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment, A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008)
(No. 1:07 cv 293), 2007 WL 4298735.
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agreement with intent to sue,135 the district court’s opinion does not suggest
this is the reason for the holding, and such a reason would make the
iParadigms holding on the infancy doctrine limited to such facts.
Alternatively, although it would not explain the holding with respect to
the other minors, the iParadigms court may have envisioned one of the
minors, A.V., as a bad actor. He misrepresented his school affiliation and
identity and used another person’s identification and password that attorney
Vanderhye discovered online.136 iParadigms counterclaimed against this
student, alleging his “misuse” of the Turnitin system was a trespass to
chattels, a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and a violation
of the Virginia Computer Crimes Act.137 But it is highly unlikely that the
district court meant to suggest the infancy doctrine was misused based on
these alleged violations since the court found them to be harmless. The
district court easily dismissed all three of these counterclaims because
iParadigms “fail[ed] to establish any actual damage or impairment to the
Turnitin system as a result of A.V.’s allegedly unauthorized submissions.”138
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed this holding with respect to the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Virginia Computer Crimes Act,
determining that iParadigms had showed evidence of qualifying damages.139
However, this later contrary conclusion cannot be attributed to the district
court or provide a reason for the district court to determine that the minors in
the case acted in bad faith.
Thus, the district court’s use of the maxim—the infancy doctrine cannot
be used as a sword—does not appear to be relevant to any aspect of infancy
law doctrine in this case and thus is not a basis for justifying the court’s
refusal to apply the doctrine. It is understandable that the district court in
iParadigms would resonate with the maxim because it was not inclined to
allow these students out of the TOS, but the maxim cannot be used as an
excuse to disregard the clear application of the infancy doctrine. The
infancy doctrine allows minors to disaffirm contracts unless one of the well

135. See, e.g., Habetz v. Condon, 618 A.2d 501 (Conn. 1992) (finding that the homeowner’s
attempt to void his contract with his home builder after his house was built because the contract was
missing a mandatory provision was in bad faith, and that the whole transaction evidenced bad faith
on the homeowner’s part, and therefore he was precluded from voiding his contract).
136. The Fourth Circuit tells us, “The password was provided to A.V. by plaintiffs’ counsel who
obtained it by conducting an internet search.” iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 635.
137. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 479.
138. Id. at 486.
139. iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 646 (“This broadly worded provision plainly contemplates
consequential damages of the type sought by iParadigms—costs incurred as part of the response to a
CFAA violation, including the investigation of an offense.”).
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articulated defenses applies. A court wishing to plow new ground and
overturn an ancient doctrine established in every jurisdiction should offer
some explanation.
So far in this Part II, I have explained why reliance on iParadigms is
misplaced, and that the retained benefits defense and the bad faith defense
are unlikely to offer much comfort to OSPs. I turn now to another defense
frequently asserted with respect to a minor’s efforts to disaffirm an online
TOS. A glance through the terms in a wide variety of TOS for businesses
likely to attract minors suggests that, if iParadigms does not save them,
OSPs plan to rely on the fraudulent misrepresentation of age defense. But
such reliance will not be successful.
D. Trojan Horses and the (Mis)representation of Age Defense
OSPs tuck representations of age into TOS, never in the first few
paragraphs and sometimes several pages down. OSPs do not provide any
warning that they plan to rely on such representations or warn that to accept
services if the representation is not true will result in consequences of any
kind going forward. In this way, OSPs seem to induce users to click (or
browse) unaware of the significance of such a representation, which can be,
and frequently is, in direct conflict with the actual personal information the
user has entered during a prior step. Like the Trojan horse, users accept
such TOS without a second thought. But “hidden” should not be as good a
strategy in contract law as it is in war. Clever or not, OSPs may fail to
realize that the representation of age inside a TOS is not nearly as deadly as
the contents of the ancient horse. In this Part II.D, I first discuss the
standards for establishing a defense based on misrepresentation of age.140
Second, I address briefly the issues surrounding investigating age online.
Finally, I describe what OSPs are doing to discover and respond to age and
compare these efforts to the standards for the defense.
As explained above in Part II.A, this defense is only available when the
adult has undertaken reasonable investigation and relies in good faith on the
results of the investigation.141 It requires more than a mere statement of
inaccurate age.142 The adult has a duty to reasonably investigate age,
notwithstanding the representation. The reliance must be “justified” and in

140. Fraudulent misrepresentation of age is, in some jurisdictions, a defense to the infancy
doctrine, and in others, a tort claim that can be raised against a minor who seeks to disaffirm a
contract. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. In this article, I discuss both as a
“defense.”
141. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 9:22 (stating that this rule is statutory in some jurisdictions).
142. See, e.g., Gillis v. Whitley’s Disc. Auto Sales, Inc., 319 S.E.2d 661, 666 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that a minor’s misrepresentation of age does not bar him from disaffirming a
contract).
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“good faith.”143 For instance, in Topheavy Studios, Inc. v. Doe,144 a minor
affirmatively presented a fake identification.145 The court held that the fake
ID was a mere attempt to defraud, and insufficient as a defense to the
infancy doctrine, which requires satisfaction of a three-part test: (1) the
minor misrepresented her age, (2) the minor intended for the other party to
rely on the misrepresentation, and (3) the party was injured as a result of its
actual and justifiable reliance.146
Of course, the issue of investigating age is more complex online. The
law relating to the fraudulent misrepresentation defense and duty to
investigate age was developed when most contracts were formed in person.
Literature refers to the notion that red flags about age would arise visually.147
What might be the equivalent online? Certainly online age verification
technology has been the subject of extended debate,148 even beyond the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA) cases.149 Online age verification
methods exist,150 and some are currently being implemented by certain
online service providers.151 Proponents argue that these methods are as good
as visual checks in at least raising the suspicion that age needs to be
investigated. “While these methods may not be one hundred percent
effective in excluding minors, neither are the current methods [used] by

143. A. D. Kaufman, Annotation, Infant’s Misrepresentation as to His Age as Estopping Him
from Disaffirming His Voidable Transaction, 29 A.L.R.3d 1270 (1970); see also DiMatteo, supra
note 91, at 497 (stating that the requirement is “reasonable reliance”).
144. No. 03-05-00022-CV, 2005 WL 1940159 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2005) (citing and
mirroring the elements of fraud discussed in Ernst & Young, LLP v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 51 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2001)).
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *4.
147. Robert G. Edge, Voidability of Minors’ Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Modern
Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205, 214–15 (1967) (quoting Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat’l Sec. Corp., 188
N.E. 726, 728 (N.Y. 1934)).
148. See, e.g., RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 39 (May 2006), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
files/ric/Publications/e04062000.pdf.
149. For an overview of the various cases and courts that addressed COPA and its age
verification affirmative defense, see American Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 185–
86 (3d Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit concluded that the “implementation of COPA’s affirmative
defenses by a Web publisher . . . would involve high costs and also would deter [adult] users from
visiting implicated Web sites.” Id. at 197.
150. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 68 (2006) (proposing a scheme of “digital
IDs” that could identify users online).
151. For instance, “Lasseters Online requires a copy (which may be a faxed or a scanned copy) of
a valid passport, drivers license, birth certificate or ‘Age identification card’ in order to prove that
the player is not a minor.” Jonathan Gottfried, Comment, The Federal Framework for Internet
Gambling, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH., Feb. 2004, at 1, 12, 37 n.158 (citing Lasseters’ Terms of Use).
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brick and mortar [businesses], which are often based on physical
appearance.”152
Further, necessity is the mother of invention and, if OSPs had sufficient
incentive, development of age verification practices would become as robust
as they are for online security services.153 In the 2008 joint statement with
state attorneys general, MySpace agreed to develop age verification
technology and to begin by organizing a task force focused on “finding and
developing online identity authentication tools.”154 The task force’s final
report does not conclude that age verification is not possible now, or in the
future.155 Rather, the still contentious debate in the report is whether such
technologies should be used.156 For purposes of this paper, I establish only
that what most OSPs are currently doing is flagrantly insufficient to evoke
the defense. I defer to another day the issues of what technology or methods
are available for age verification, their effectiveness against tech-savvy or
dishonest youth, and the tradeoffs in terms of privacy for minors and
burdens on adults using websites.
A study of the current practices with respect to age makes it difficult to
take seriously any claimed commitment of OSPs to avoid teenage customers.
The practice of eBay and a few other sites with respect to pre-teens
demonstrates that the OSPs know how to take precautionary measures.157

152. Id. at 10.
153. Some of the many services Norton offers, including Antispyware, are Antirootkit, Smart
Firewall, Network Mapping & Monitoring, Anti-Spam, Identity Protection, and Download
Protection, among others. Norton AntiVirus 2011, NORTON, http://antivirus.norton.com/norton/
ps/1up_us_en_ght1.html?om_sem_cid=hho_sem_sy:us:ggl:en:e|kw0000004480|6514133956
(last
visited Oct. 27, 2011).
154. JOINT STATEMENT ON KEY PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES SAFETY 1 (Jan. 14,
2008), available at http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/press_releases/
2008/01/14/.pdf (MySpace agreed to organize a task force focused on “finding and developing
online identity authentication tools.”). The task force was convened and issued its final report on
December 31, 2008. ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY AND ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES: FINAL REPORT OF
THE INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE TO THE MULTI-STATE WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL
NETWORKING OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (John Palfrey, danah boyd
& Dena Sacco eds., 2010) [hereinafter ISTTF REPORT].
155. In fact, the final report describes a variety of existing age verification practices. ISTTF
REPORT, supra note 154, at 30–31.
156. Professor Palfrey’s introduction to the ISTTF Report explains:
Some argue that the use of . . . age verification in particular, ought to be widespread, if
not mandatory . . . . Others argue that . . . [t]he extensive use of strong authentication and
age verification technologies will not solve the problem, . . . and will bring with them
negative externalities, including risks to innovation, free expression and privacy.
Id. at xvi.
157. eBay is such a recognized avenue of business and commerce for teenagers that teenagerfocused entrepreneurial advice websites offer articles on how teenagers can set up shop on eBay.
See, e.g., R. Sharp, Run an eBay Business from Your Own Home—A Guide for Teens, EZINE
@RTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?Run-an-eBay-Business-From-Your-Own-Home---A-Guide-forTeens&id=680961 (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); Personal Finance: How Teens Can Make Money with
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Juxtaposed against the numerous websites that take serious steps to prohibit
pre-teen users from accessing services, websites which undertake no age
inquiry or allow self-identified minors to register anyway, cannot argue that
the online format has hoodwinked them into dealing with a minor against
their will. Adults who voluntarily enter transactions with minors seem
willing to assume the risk that minors will void the contracts.
OSPs’ treatment of youth under thirteen, as compared to youth under
eighteen, illustrates that, first, OSPs are not making even a minimal effort to
exclude older teens or to ascertain actual age, and, second, OSPs know how
to exclude most users based on age disclosures when they so choose.
Although it may be practically difficult to prevent persistent minors from
improperly obtaining access to online services, hardly any OSPs do anything
even to discourage underage customers or to prevent a minor from
proceeding who has truthfully self-identified as under age.
Twitter158 and Amazon,159 for instance, do not bother to inquire about
age when opening an account. MySpace,160 Facebook,161 Google,162 Blogger
(a Google service),163 YouTube,164 and Yahoo!165 require a date of birth.
They then block anyone who has entered an age that would make the person
younger than thirteen years old from establishing an account or using the
service. OSPs are particularly leery of pre-teens because of the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA).166 COPPA’s provisions
set forth restrictions on the gathering and use of pre-teens’ personal
information.167 Rather than risk liability for failure to comply with the
statute, most sites are programmed to refuse access to a person self-

eBay, ERUPTINGMIND EDUC., http://www.eruptingmind.com/teens-make-money-ebay/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2011).
158. TWITTER, https://twitter.com/signup (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
159. AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/flex/sign-in/select.html (enter e-mail address; then
select “No, I am a new customer”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
160. MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (click “Sign Up”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
161. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
162. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (click “Sign in”; then “Create an account now”) (last
visited Feb. 7, 2012).
163. BLOGGER, http://www.google.com/accounts/ServiceLogin?service=blogger&passive=12096
00&continue=http://blogger.com/home&followup=http://www.blogger.com/home&ltmpl=start#s01
(click “Get started”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
164. YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (click “Create Account”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
165. YAHOO!, http://www.yahoo.com (click “New here? Sign Up”) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006); Jill Joline Myers & Gayle Tronvig Carper, Cyber Bullying: The
Legal Challenge for Educators, 238 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 6–7 (2008) (discussing some OSPs’ responses
to COPPA’s preteen restrictions, primarily allowing access to services only to those over thirteen).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (2006).
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identified as under age thirteen. In addition, some sites are programmed to
continue to block a user who changes a birth date after being refused access
for entering a date making the user under age thirteen.
Efforts to similarly block teens ages thirteen to seventeen are extremely
rare. The registration page for eBay, on one hand, has a conspicuous notice
that users must be eighteen years or older, and it follows through by
blocking registration to users who give a birth date making them under
Most other OSPs do not take the same precautions.
eighteen.168
Facebook,169 Google,170 Blogger,171 YouTube,172 and Yahoo!173 each have a
clause in their TOS agreement in which the user purportedly recites adult
age qualification, but none of the sites prevent users who have entered birth
dates that conflict with such a representation from establishing accounts and
using their services. Whatever is required for a reasonable investigation and
good faith reliance on an intentionally fraudulent assertion of age, this will
not qualify.
In addition to the three defenses discussed above in Part II, another
challenge that seems particularly pertinent to the application of the infancy
doctrine in the online context is the superior expertise demonstrated by many
minors in the use of technology. The last section of this part addresses this
argument.
E. Cyberpunk Versus Cybersense
Children through time have learned how to deal with gadgets their
parents never fathomed.174 Without question, in many homes minors are
more comfortable with technology, especially the Internet, than adults.175

168. EBAY, http://www.ebay.com (click “Register”) (last visited Oct. 27, 2011).
169. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, ¶ 4.5, http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook TOS].
170. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, ¶ 2.3, http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last visited
Oct. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Google TOS].
171. Blogger Terms of Service, BLOGGER, ¶ 1, http://www.blogger.com/terms.g (last visited Oct.
29, 2011).
172. Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, ¶ 12, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Oct. 29,
2011).
173. Yahoo! Terms of Service, YAHOO!, ¶ 3, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos173.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
174. See GUSTAVO S. MESCH & ILAN TALMUD, WIRED YOUTH: THE SOCIAL WORLD OF
ADOLESCENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7 (2010) (explaining that today’s children differ in many
ways from their parents’ generation, “express[ing] different values, attitudes and behaviours to those
of their predecessors” as a result of growing up “[i]mmersed in [modern] technologies”).
175. Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 45 (1995) (“Many parents complain that access by children to computer
information . . . is very difficult to control. This difficulty may even be exacerbated by the greater
prevalence of computer literacy in minors than in adults.”); Daniel, supra note 7, at 241 (“[M]inors
tend to be more comfortable and proficient with web-based devices than many adults.”); see also
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For many American families, the children are the only ones with the
required technological and language skills to use the Internet.176 One
critique of the infancy doctrine is that technologically skilled minors could
use the infancy doctrine to wreak havoc on innocent, unsuspecting,
Thus, the argument goes, minors’
computer-challenged adults.177
technological savvy challenges the presumption of unequal bargaining
power, which is one of the underlying assumptions of the infancy
doctrine.178
The technical skill argument is a red herring. The need for the infancy
doctrine arises from the flaws in the substantive decision to purchase a
product or service and the legal implications of the often invisible and
elaborate terms, not the mode by which the contract is executed.179 The
infancy doctrine is designed to protect minors from “crafty adults” and
“from their own want of sound judgment,” not merely as a safeguard for
minors incorrectly using the technology in the process of contracting.180 The
terms of contracts are no less dangerous when they are accepted with a click
of a mouse rather than a signature on a hard-copy document. In fact, as
discussed in more detail in Part III.B below, TOS tend to be particularly
abusive, pushing the boundaries of overreaching terms in longer, denser
texts hidden behind a hyperlink in an obscure corner of a webpage.181
To the extent the understanding of the technology matters, familiarity of
the mechanisms for contracting online may actually increase the need for the
protections of the infancy doctrine. Minors contracting online may feel
(falsely) empowered by their greater understanding of the tools they are
using. Comfort with the technology may overshadow the discomfort that
should exist when faced with significant decisions and a representation that
states the user has read and understood the terms (assuming the OSP has
MESCH & TALMUD, supra note 174, at 12 (“Families are social systems characterized by a hierarchy
of authority. The computer can change this hierarchy, as the adolescent, a frequent user, becomes
the family expert upon whom other family members rely for technical advice and guidance.”).
176. See Cate, supra note 175, at 45.
177. See Daniel, supra note 7, at 241; DiMatteo, supra note 91, at 485.
178. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2004); see also Algeria Ford, School Liability: Holding Middle
Schools Liable for Cyber-Bullying Despite Their Implementation of Internet Usage Contracts, 38
J.L. & EDUC. 535, 537 (2009) (citing Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 697 A.2d 1358, 1364 (Md.
1997)).
179. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2004).
180. Id.
181. See Ryan Patrick Murray, Comment, MySpace-ing is Not a Crime: Why Breaching Terms of
Service Agreements Should Not Implicate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 475, 490 (2009) (“The TOS agreements of most sites are hidden behind a hyperlink at the
bottom of a webpage and are long, unorganized, and written in incomprehensible legalese.”).
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included that much of a warning). Although adults may be confounded by
the unintelligible legalese, they have some experience with which to process
a TOS. Youth are less likely to have been exposed to words and phrases
such as “indemnification,” “hold harmless,” “arbitration,” “waived
warranties,” and so forth.182 Adept hacking skills do not prepare one for the
implications of legal liability.
Whatever the merits of redesigning the infancy doctrine, the online
context seems to be a particularly inappropriate place to abandon the
doctrine, notwithstanding the technological immersion of digital youth. I
pursue this theme further in Part III, where I review the kinds of specific
consumer protection issues raised with TOS and the status of the larger
debate about their enforceability.
III. BOTTLENECKED IN THE TOS BLACK BOX
The focus of this article is the application of the infancy doctrine to
contracting online. This part reviews what about online contracts may raise
different issues than contracts in the real world and how those differences
should influence the application of the infancy doctrine. TOS create greater
challenges for traditional contract law in three ways. First, the process of
manifesting assent is frequently blurred or nonexistent. Second, notice of
the contractual terms is weak and any assent is unknowing. And third, the
temptation to include every possible waiver of consumer rights and every
possible grant of power in favor of the drafting party overcomes restraint
when virtually unlimited text space is crammed behind a tiny hyperlink or
diffused over multiple webpages. The contents of such text space cannot be
hefted, let alone seen, in their entirety at any one time.
The obligations minors undertake in entering online contracts are
typically twofold: they commit to pay a price for goods and services, and
they agree to be bound by a variety of legal terms. With respect to the first
risk—price—online markets are less prone to take advantage of minors than
the bargaining situations confronting minors in the prior centuries when the
doctrine was being solidified. The kind of haggling about price and hard
bargaining common at car lots and craft fairs is uncommon online. Because
there is no visual contact, the OSP may be less aware of the particular
vulnerabilities of individual customers than in the real world. On the other
hand, some OSPs expressly target minors, and most large scale services
collect enough data on their marketing objectives and successes to
understand when the demographics point to large numbers of minors. In
addition, ongoing services frequently require opening an account and
supplying a birth date, so OSPs have clear data on the ages of their users.

182. See 43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2004).

254

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 225, 2012]

2/13/2012 2:03 PM

CyberInfants
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Through cookies, OSPs could link each customer account with a version of
the webpage tailored to play to customer interests and vulnerabilities.
Notwithstanding access to this information and technology, pricing online
seems to be uniform and, for this article, I will assume that the prices minors
pay online present no unique problems.
The more difficult question with online contracting is the legal terms to
which users become bound in many TOS. Like many adults, minors may be
totally unaware that simply opening and using a free program may form a
browsewrap contract. A click on “I accept” means no more to minors than
to adults. Minors may be prepared to understand and compare prices, but
minors as a class are less likely to understand, let alone fairly evaluate and
compare, the legalese included in TOS.
It is not my purpose to review all of the arguments on the merits of
TOS, pro or con. Rather, for purposes of this paper, I briefly situate the
infancy doctrine in the context of the critiques of online contracting. Part
III.A starts with the larger trends in contract law, both on and offline,
favoring powerful repeat players by loosening assent requirements and
forsaking unconscionability. Part III.B then looks specifically at the contract
enforcement issues raised by TOS as to adults and compares the risks when
minors are involved. Part III.C briefly surveys the reach of common TOS
provisions. This part concludes that terms imposed by TOS tend to be
lengthier, less comprehensible, and more overreaching than real-world
contracts, even though courts still seem willing to enforce them. While the
terms imposed on minors are no more offensive than the terms imposed on
adults, this caldron of potential contract abuse seems an unwise place to
begin eviscerating deeply entrenched common-law and statutory protections
for minors.
A. Loosewrap Jurisprudence
In the last decade, “real-world” or “paper” contract law has become
noticeably more tolerant of a lack of manifestation of assent,183 adhesion

183. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428–30 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding
a browsewrap agreement despite a lack of conscious assent and arguing that, if there is indication
that consumers know terms exist and take a benefit, it makes economic sense to bind them even
though traditional subjective and objective manifestations of assent are absent); Pollstar v. Gigmania
Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980–82 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (enforcing a browsewrap agreement even though
the court concluded “that many visitors to the site may not be aware of the license agreement
[because] [n]otice of the license agreement is provided by small gray text on a gray background”).
The infamous opinion that may be the root of this tolerance is ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
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contracts,184 and terms once thought to be overreaching.185 The Supreme
Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute186 and the Seventh Circuit in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg187 served up influential opinions that enforced
fine print, real-world contracts with terms that were received by the other
party after contract formation occurred under traditional principles. As
discussed in more detail in Part IV.B below,188 both courts relied on the
assumption that such contracting served economic efficiencies and reduced
costs to users and consumers, an assumption strongly supported by some
commentators.189 Others are cynical about this economic analysis and the
comparative weighing of business and consumer benefits.190 Particularly in
the context of applying contract law to technology transactions, courts have
shown deference to the importance of supporting an emerging
technology/digital market.191

1447 (7th Cir. 1996), which is discussed at length infra in the text accompanying notes 270–75, and
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
184. See Deborah Zalesne, Enforcing the Contract at All (Social) Costs: The Boundary Between
Private Contract Law and the Public Interest, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 579, 585–86 (2005)
(discussing the level to which contracts of adhesion have become enforceable against both
individuals and businesses).
185. See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (upholding a forum
selection clause against complaints that the term amounted to substantive unconscionability and
recognizing the prolific use and validity of these clauses in today’s contracts); Amy J. Schmitz,
Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 91 (2006) (recognizing
“courts’ current constraint” in applying the unconscionability doctrine, thus upholding powerful
terms against claims that they are overreaching).
186. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
187. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
188. See discussion of the economic benefits of form contracts infra in the text accompanying
notes 267–69.
189. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 829 (2006) (arguing that there are advantages—lower
transaction and agency costs, which lead to lower-priced goods and services—to having standard
nonnegotiable contracts in a competitive marketplace and claiming that the majority of courts agree
and therefore are willing to enforce contracts of adhesion).
190. See Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad
Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 717–18 (2004)
(arguing that Judge Easterbrook erroneously applied economic analysis, believing it would help
maintain lower product prices, when in truth his holding may actually “increase transaction costs,
enhance hold-up or opportunistic behavior by vendors, and result in inefficiencies as well as
distributional unfairness by systematically redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors”); see
also Glynn Lunney, Protecting Digital Works: Copyright or Contract?, 1 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP., Spring 1999, at 1, 23 n.38 (“For ProCD to attempt such a price discrimination scheme, it
must have some degree of monopoly in the market for telephone listings. Given such monopoly,
there is little reason to expect the market to constrain effectively ProCD’s attempt to impose
improper and inefficient terms in the use agreement.”).
191. Historical and current trends in contract law are more fully discussed in Preston & McCann,
supra note 13.
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The consumer protection movement in American jurisprudence began in
the 1960s and hit its apex in the 1970s.192 The unconscionability doctrine
emerged as the mechanism for policing contract overreaching early in the
movement.193 The focus has shifted and consumer interests are now more
freely subsumed by renewed support for powerful, repeat players.
Currently, the unconscionability doctrine is being applied only rarely by
increasingly conservative judges fearful of activism charges. Further, online
clientele are not as likely to be the same kind of sympathetic party as the
inner-city, undereducated, single, welfare mother without transportation to
any other retailer, who successfully avoided contract enforcement in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., sometimes viewed as the
Courts tend to reserve
foundational unconscionability case.194
unconscionability relief for parties disadvantaged by age, education,195
language, and experience.196
Nonetheless, a few commentators believe the unconscionability doctrine
is sufficient even to combat the abuses of TOS.197 Most commentators who

192. Jane K. Winn & Mark Webber, The Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law on U.S.
Business-To-Consumer Internet Merchants, 62 BUS. LAW. 209, 211 (2006) (noting decrease in U.S.
consumer protection legal activity since the 1960s and 1970s).
193. Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy
for Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 348–49 (2010) (explaining that
unconscionability was a primary tool courts used to protect consumers from overreaching acts
throughout the 1960s and 1970s).
194. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Professor Stewart Macaulay notes the use of this case as the
core teaching vehicle for the unconscionability doctrine. “The Williams decision quickly became a
favorite of law review and casebook authors. It still is. For example, my survey of fourteen
casebooks published since 1980 shows that nearly everyone includes it.” Stewart Macaulay,
Address, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair
and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 579
(1989) (footnote omitted). However, he continues, “[t]he opinion is largely liberal symbolism,
blinding us to the structural changes needed to attack poverty.” Id. at 581. Others criticize the use
of this case, fearing harms that may follow its reinforcement of race and class stereotypes. Miriam
A. Cherry, Exploring (Social) Class in the Classroom: The Case of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28
PACE L. REV. 235, 243 (2008) (citing AMY HILSMAN KASTELY, DEBORAH WAIRE POST, SHARON
KANG HOM & NANCY OTA, CONTRACTING LAW (4th ed. 2006)).
195. Marshall v. Mercury Fin. Co., 550 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (describing
unconscionability as a remedy for the uneducated and unsophisticated, and refusing relief to a
college educated plaintiff).
196. Jennifer M. Ralph, Comment, Unconscionable Mediation Clauses: Garrett v. HootersToldeo, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 383, 396 (2005) (“[C]ases that have addressed unconscionability
in the context of an ADR agreement have also considered factors such as the plaintiff’s ‘age,
education, intelligence, and business acumen and experience.’” (citing Sikes v. Ganley Pontiac
Honda, Inc., No. 82889, 2004 WL 67224, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2004))).
197. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 493–95 (2002) (recognizing Internet-specific contract
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have noted the increasing trend for courts to enforce contracts with
overreaching terms question the ability of existing contract doctrines to limit
TOS abuses.198 In particular, some argue that the unconscionability doctrine
is not being effectively applied by courts to police TOS,199 and others argue
that unconscionability is an improper vehicle for policing overreaching
contracts.200 Thus, although TOS formation procedures, if any, combined
with the bevy of extreme substantive terms should be enough, the likelihood
of equitable relief in this climate seems unpromising.
This movement in contract law favoring powerful actors and diluting the
protections for vulnerable parties may itself be the best argument for the
need to retain the infancy doctrine.201 Against this background, the peculiar
characteristics of TOS are assessed in the next subpart, both as they apply
generally to adults and as they become heightened when minors are
involved.
B. Fat TOS and the FUD They Should Invoke
The process of entering into, and the content of, a typical TOS are
roundly criticized by Professors Mark Lemley,202 Nancy Kim,203 and others

concerns, but finding adequate recourse in traditional doctrine, particularly the doctrine of
unconscionability).
198. See, e.g., Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 472–73 (2008) (arguing that unconscionability is inadequate for the task
and suggesting that a better solution would be requiring “knowing assent,” rather than what some
courts are currently calling “assent” or “mutual assent,” to enforce standard form contract terms).
See also Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2006); Schmitz, supra note 185.
199. See, e.g., Bern, supra note 190, at 795 (arguing that the only mechanism for policing
contracts of adhesion is through current unconscionability doctrines which are far too weak to put
buyers on equal ground with sellers); William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over
Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1099, 1117–18 (2004) (arguing that doctrines such as
unconscionability are currently insufficient to properly rein in the recent and unrelenting expansion
of rolling contract doctrine, particularly in online contracting).
The effectiveness of
unconscionability doctrine in the TOS context is developed more fully in Preston & McCann, supra
note 13.
200. Zalesne, supra note 184, at 597. She argues that unconscionability has the effect of
quashing negative behavior when strictly enforced, but often “harms the very parties such doctrines
are intended to protect . . . [w]hen courts fail to enforce contracts based on unconscionability.” Id. It
follows that current unconscionability doctrine for dealing with problems, such as adhesion, should
likely be reevaluated. See id.
201. Daniel, supra note 7, at 240, 255 (“The long-accepted rationale for the minority incapacity
doctrine” provides “a general recognition that minors deserve protection from their online
escapades.”).
202. Lemley, supra note 11.
203. Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797 (2007).
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for their lack of notice and adhesiveness,204 even with respect to enforcement
against adults. The basis for these critiques depends on a careful comparison
between the process, timing, incentives, mechanisms, and psychology of
contracting in cyberspace as opposed to the world in which contract law and
the infancy doctrine in particular have been formed.
To begin with, fewer offline transactions involve significant boilerplate
terms. When consumers pay cash and go into a movie there may be some
sort of contract, but it includes only those words that can fit across the
bottom or the back of the ticket. They can buy a handbag and walk out of
the store protected by implied Uniform Commercial Code warranties and
without committing to resolve any dispute with the vendor in Santa Clara
County, California. They can mail a letter and photographs without granting
the postmaster a global license to the use of their creative works for any
purpose and forever.
Some offline transactions involve a complex set of terms similar to
those typically found in TOS. Although the Internet has effectively replaced
many forms of interaction, webpages do not offer any substitute for the
precautionary function of feeling the size of a tangible multiple-page
document, seeing the serious format and the obvious work of well-paid
attorneys, and devoting the time for a formal signature, let alone the
ritualistic significance of going to the provider’s office to “execute” the
contract. The contract provider’s mere presence in any location creates yet
another trigger for the consumer to recognize the significance of her actions.
A person asked to sign a lease or license in the brick-and-mortar world
may well balk at signing ten pages of small print and begin asking questions
about the implications of the document. Online, such a person cannot
readily comprehend the enormity of the terms, and there is no one with
whom to discuss them. The ability to tuck in heaps of virtually invisible and
under-scrutinized terms is a notable characteristic of cyberspace.
Most real-world consumers will be aware they are contracting if the
length of the terms exceeds the back of the receipt. On the other hand, vast
legal consequences hidden behind a hyperlink embedded in some brief
phrase are activated with a click thought of only as a request to continue to
the next page. With such a clickwrap contract, if anyone sees the link and
follows it, she may find that the next screen is also highlighted with other
204. Criticism of the “rolling contract” concept traced to ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996), may also be applied to all wrap contracts. See, e.g., Bern, supra note 190, at
641–710, 766–67, 795 (harshly criticizing Judge Easterbrook’s “terms later” analysis and arguing
that allowing sellers another avenue for abusing buyers in the contracting process increases the
power imbalance).
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hyperlinks to other elements of the overall legal commitment. For example,
Professor Nancy Kim dissects the TOS for Gap.com to demonstrate that a
user must engage in a virtual scavenger hunt just to obtain each piece of the
TOS that the consumer is allegedly bound to by using the services.205 Other
TOS, such as Google’s, simply refer to and incorporate into the “Universal
Terms” any number of other collections of terms without the benefit of
hyperlinks.206 Of course, the terms comprising a browsewrap contract are
not even this obvious. The consumer is not asked to click, and the contract
can become binding without moving a curser anywhere near a link to the
terms.
But then, even users expressly directed to TOS will typically not
actually read them.207 Flipping through for an overview of the terms is not
as practical online. An OSP might easily use available technology to make
terms conspicuous without the additional expense associated with printing
user-friendly forms; flashing, variegated colors and sound might be
interesting. Easy coding can serve to direct readers to the most significant or
dangerous terms. Including links to external resources for understanding the
significance of certain kinds of terms would be simple. But OSPs have not
bothered with these approaches because judicial and economic pressure have
never materialized. The best solution for OSPs is to decrease the likelihood
that anyone will read them.
Consumers may suffer some increased vulnerability to fraud and
unreliable business practices and products online, and such problems may be
more difficult for consumers to resolve.208 Established merchants in the
brick-and-mortar neighborhood have likely been vetted by people the
consumer knows and trusts, and such businesses must have demonstrated
some reliability to support their longevity. On the other hand, a webpage

205. Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327,
1358 (2011) (analyzing the Gap browsewrap agreement which notes, “Your submission of personal
information through the Sites is governed by our privacy policy, which can be reached by clicking
on the ‘Privacy Policy’ link located in the footer section of the Sites. . . . This Agreement
incorporates by reference the terms and conditions of the Privacy Policy.”); see also Juliet M.
Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1331 (2005)
(asking whether “an Internet user [should] be required to click through a series of pages to find the
contract terms to which she is agreeing”).
206. Google TOS, supra note 170, ¶ 1.4.
207. Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons Learned
and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 7, 24
(2009) (noting the general acceptance that consumers typically do not read online contracts); Robert
A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms
Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 840–41 (2006) (recognizing that Internet users do not usually
read terms, let alone understand them or the potential risks attached to them).
208. See Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 743 (2005); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 197, at 468.
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may look like an established business even though it is in its first day of
operation.
Customers of physical businesses can identify the people who own the
business or those who work there if the principals are not apparent. Local
owners and employees may have more incentive to avoid creating unhappy
customers who are going to appear in person, raise their voices, and create
an uncomfortable scene. Moreover, legal disputes that arise are more
cheaply and easily solved by the consumer. The real-world product or
service provider is less likely to attach significant fine print to ordinary
transactions. Without a forum selection clause, a dispute with such a
provider may be resolvable in a local court. Without a sweeping waiver of
responsibility or liability, a consumer at least retains a cause of action to
pursue.
Of course, many eStores and services have what digital natives may
think of as eons of longevity and may be used regularly by all of one’s
acquaintances. Minors are accustomed to relying on others to check for their
safety. In fact, minors may perceive that they are so restricted from what
adults think is dangerous—such as buying alcohol, entering a casino, or
holding a credit card—that anything they are permitted to do without a fuss
must be eminently safe. Minors may also rely heavily on the crowd;209 one
may think that, because everyone is doing it, someone must have figured out
the fine print and decided it was not a problem—if a minor is aware of fine
print at all.
In addition to the lack of signals warning that practically invisible,
extraordinarily lengthy and complex terms lurk online, digital transactions
feed on impulsiveness and exaggerate weaknesses in judgment and
inaccurate assessments of risk.210 A product or service may be located with
a browser, selected by the buyer/user based on a digital image, and
purchased through an electronic shopping cart using a secure socket layer to
transmit virtual cash—all within seconds. Professor Susan Gindin’s analysis
of the Sears privacy disclosure case describes studies showing that the
nature of the Internet forum and the dramatically increased number of
contracts entered per online consumer makes these consumers “unlikely to
consider the legal consequences of [their] online behavior.”211

209. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see MURRAY KRANTZ, CHILD DEVELOPMENT: RISK
AND OPPORTUNITY 510 (1994).

210. See Preston & McCann, supra note 13 (addressing why people are more impulsive online
and the cautionary issues involved with online contracting).
211. Gindin, supra note 207, at 7.
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The psychological dynamics of entering fast and easy contracts online
are reviewed with compelling insights by Professor Juliet Moringiello.212
Moringiello specifically notes the significance of having a person present in
the face-to-face contracting as both a source of information and a prompt for
the other party to recognize the legal implications of the decision.213
Additionally, Moringiello argues that taking the time to apply a physical
signature to a document rather than quickly clicking through a page has
some psychological effect, as “we are conditioned to think that we are doing
something important.”214 Digital purchasers need not form even the
forethought necessary to get dressed, move from a comfortable chair, and
drive themselves to a store during business hours. Online, the stores are at
one’s fingertips twenty-four hours a day.
Adults regularly succumb. But the power of instant gratification to
overcome judgment is magnified by the nature of minors. Recent
neuroscience research suggests that minors’ brains are structurally immature
and that the pre-frontal cortex, responsible for impulse control, is one of the
last areas of the brain to mature,215 and so minors’ ability to “exhibit adult
levels of judgment and control” are generally limited.216 When mixed with
one-click satisfaction, minors’ tendency toward impulsiveness and risk
taking becomes toxic.
Of course, if the provisions of TOS were balanced and reasonable, the
process of, and motivations for, entering into them become relatively
insignificant. In the next subpart, I briefly survey the kinds of terms
common in TOS.

212. Moringiello, supra note 205, at 1347.
213. Id. at 1315.
214. Id. at 1316.
215. Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n & the Am. Acad. of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 13, 23, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No.
08-7412), 2009 WL 2247127 [hereinafter AMA Brief]. Id. at 18, 25–26 (“[A]dolescents experience
increasing motivation for risky and reward-seeking behavior without a corresponding increase in the
ability to self-regulate behavior.” (citing Amy L. Krain et al., An fMRI Examination of
Developmental Differences in the Neural Correlates of Uncertainty and Decision-Making, 47 J.
CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1023 (2006))). For more discussion of the recent medical studies
and how they inform minors’ capacity to contract, see Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther,
Legal Osmosis: Allowing Science to Inform Law’s Conceptions of Childhood (forthcoming); see also
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1009, 1013 (2003) (citing Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral
Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAV. REVS. 417 (2000)).
216. AMA Brief, supra note 215, at 4.
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C. Standard Protocol TOS
Several writers have expounded on various TOS that could be
considered overreaching with respect to adults, standing alone or in
conjunction with other factors,217 including me.218 A thorough cataloguing is
unnecessary, but awareness of typical terms that would likely bewilder a
minor (if read) or implicate important interests of minors is useful for
weighing the infancy doctrine’s viability online.
Although minors may have some understanding of the jury system, they
seem ill-suited to weighing the disadvantages of abandoning the
constitutional right to a jury, with or without arbitration. Rather than an
arbitration clause, the MySpace TOS provides: “Each of the parties hereby
knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally waives any right it may have to a
trial by jury in respect of any litigation (including, but not limited to, any
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third party claims) arising out of,
under or in connection with this agreement.”219
Fewer TOS now contain mandatory arbitration clauses following Specht
v. Netscape Communications Corp.,220 McKee v. AT & T Corp.,221 and Bragg
v. Linden Research, Inc.,222 though some still do.223 Further, such clauses are
likely to have renewed popularity following the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,224 broadening the
enforcement of arbitration clauses.
Notwithstanding many staunch
supporters, a commitment to mandatory arbitration ought not be taken

217. See, e.g., Gindin, supra note 207, at 35–36 (providing cases that have held clauses in online
contracts unconscionable); Murray, supra note 181, at 489–90 (2009) (applying tests from NEC
Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 771–72 (Ga. 1996), and finding TOS agreements
“procedurally and substantively unconscionable”).
218. See Preston & McCann, supra note 13.
219. MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE, ¶ 16 (June 25, 2009),
http://www.myspace.com/Help/Terms [hereinafter MySpace TOS].
220. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (identifying the degree to which users should reasonably have
been aware of the arbitration clause in a technology contract).
221. 191 P.3d 845 (Wash. 2008) (finding a TOS with an arbitration clause was a contract of
adhesion, unconscionable, and overly harsh).
222. 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding arbitration clause unenforceable under
California unconscionability law).
223. Professor Schmitz studied “wireless phone service contracts from the nine major providers
with a presence in Colorado. All of the companies required arbitration of consumer claims.” Amy J.
Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 147 (2010). She also reports on a study finding that “[75%] of the [enduser license agreements] studied had choice of law clauses, 28% had choice of forum clauses, and
only 6% had arbitration clauses.” Id. at 137–38.
224. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
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lightly. Professor Amy Schmitz has published extensively on arbitration
clauses.225 She documents that “overly burdensome” arbitration clauses are
rampant, especially online.226
TOS typically include a number of other material terms once considered
overreaching and unenforceable, such as a mandatory choice of venue.
These are now joined by terms that reach even further. Professor David
Horton describes various types of unilateral modification clauses common in
TOS, and the varying degrees of obligations the OSP retains in informing
the consumer of changes.227 The TOS for MySpace,228 Twitter,229 and
Amazon230 give the OSPs the power to unilaterally modify the user
agreement. MySpace does not even agree to provide the user with
notification of any changes, instead stating that it is the user’s obligation to
read the TOS regularly to make sure she still agrees to all the terms.231 Even
if real assent were required to enter a TOS, it is difficult to argue that a user
knowingly conferred on the other contractual party a carte blanche to make
and remake any contract it likes. The use of unilateral modification clauses
“widens the informational gulf between drafters and adherents [and]
increases the burden on the judicial system.”232 Yet courts are upholding
such clauses.233 Expecting a minor to regularly check for significant
changes in his or her contractual risks is even less realistic than assuming he
or she will feed the dog twice a day without reminders.
Some OSPs in their TOS claim to own the rights to all material posted
or submitted to their sites for any purpose, including the right to copy,
sublicense, and distribute that material. For instance, “you grant us a nonexclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use

225. Schmitz, supra note 223, at 168–69.
226. Id. at 116 (“Companies increasingly include arbitration clauses among the ‘modular’ terms
cobbled into boilerplate contracts. . . . Commentators and policymakers worry that pre-dispute
arbitration clauses rob consumers of their judicial recourse rights without knowing consent and
unfairly advantage corporate ‘repeat players’ who routinely include arbitration clauses in their form
consumer contracts.”).
227. David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57
UCLA L. REV. 605, 623–53, 661–62 (2010).
228. MySpace TOS, supra note 219, at Introductory para. 3.
229. Terms of Service, TWITTER, para. 16 (June 11, 2011), http://twitter.com/tos.
230. Terms of Use, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, para. 13, http://aws.amazon.com/terms (last
updated Feb. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Amazon TOS].
231. MySpace TOS, supra note 219, at Introductory para. 3.
232. Horton, supra note 227, at 605.
233. Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 604 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding a unilateral
modification clause because the party with the power to modify was limited in the agreement to only
modify “non-material” terms); Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, No. 2:07-CV-916, 2008 WL
2465450, at *7 (D. Utah June 16, 2008) (upholding a unilateral modification clause because the
consumer could have easily viewed the agreement online and noticed updates); Bank One, N.A. v.
Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 836 (S.D. Miss. 2001), aff’d, 34 F. App’x 964 (5th Cir. 2002)
(upholding an arbitration clause that was unilaterally added).
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any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook.”234
Professor Cromer Young and others have addressed the harrowing notion
that sites could exercise such a clause to limit a minor’s use of her own
creative work at a future time.235 For example, children on Disney’s Club
Penguin site are “encouraged to author articles, jokes, poems, and other
works,” and then grant Disney an irrevocable license to the intellectual
property rights according to the TOS.236 While not all material posted on
Facebook or sent by e-mail is worthy of Shakespeare or Picasso, many
minors are exceptionally creative and the Internet has opened possibilities
for marketing intellectual property previously unavailable to budding artists
and poets in prior generations.
Moreover, minors may be less cautious than adults in posting pictures of
themselves and their friends online. The image of a young girl taken by her
church counselor and posted on Yahoo!’s Flickr appeared on bus shelters all
over major metropolitan centers in Australia, with captions such as “FREE
VIRGIN TO VIRGIN TEXTING,” as part of Virgin Australia’s ad
campaign for mobile phone services.237 Even if such use was not offensive
to the pictured minor, large-scale commercial use without compensation is
surely not contemplated by minors who post photos online. The notion that
minors knowingly grant what appears to be an exclusive license for
exploitation of their content seems absurd.
Finally, consider the two TOS presented in the iParadigms case.238
Although the minors in the case were found to have accepted the User
Agreement by clicking,239 Turnitin also had another set of terms titled
“Usage Policy” that purported to become binding when the site was used,
even without the submission of a paper. The first paragraph of this Usage
Policy warned: “IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS, PROMPTLY EXIT THIS SITE.”240 Apparently, continuing
on the site for the purpose of reading the terms of the Usage Policy makes
reading them irrelevant, as acceptance has already occurred.
234. Facebook TOS, supra note 169, ¶ 2.1.
235. Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 444–47; Heather Hruby, Comment, That’s Show Business
Kid: An Overview of Contract Law in the Entertainment Industry, 27 J. JUV. L. 47 (2006).
236. Cromer Young, supra note 20, at 446 (footnotes omitted).
237. Chang ex. rel. Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-1767-D, 2009 WL 111570,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009).
238. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 478–79 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
239. Id. at 480.
240. Usage Policy, TURNITIN, https://turnitin.com/static/aboutus/usage.php (last visited Oct. 28,
2011).
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Although the district court in iParadigms did not apply the browsewrap
Usage Policy, it did enforce the User Agreement, which the court
characterizes as the Clickwrap Agreement.241 The district court drew the
line at the browsewrap Usage Policy242 because of two problems: (1) the
Clickwrap Agreement stated that it was the sole agreement for users, thereby
contradicting the existence of the additional Usage Policy, and (2) the
minors never gave knowing and meaningful assent to the Usage Policy
because they did not know it existed and were not required to see it or even
given a link to it.243 The existence of multiple sets of terms, as was the case
here, itself identifies another kind of risk not common in hard copy
contracts, but prevalent online.
But the Clickwrap Agreement in iParadigms was bad enough on its
own. It contained a sweeping waiver of liability.244 The waiver purports to
waive everything, including intentional torts and strict liability statutory
claims.245 Moreover, even if the cause of action survives, the waiver cancels
every possible kind of damages.246 The court interpreted the waiver to
counter the minors’ claims, although the examples following the first
italicized phrase below are centered around claims caused by the OSP’s
misfeasance:
In no event shall iParadigms, LLC and/or its suppliers be liable for
any direct, indirect, punitive, incidental, special, or consequential
damages arising out of or in any way connected with the use of this
web site or with the delay or inability to use this web site, or for any
information, software, products, and services obtained through this
web site, or otherwise arising out of the use of this web site, whether
based in contract, tort, strict liability or otherwise, even if
iParadigms, inc. or any of its suppliers has been advised of the
possibility of damages. 247

241. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
242. Id. at 479.
243. Id. at 484–85.
244. Id. at 478.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. The waiver in the iParadigms’ TOS might have been challenged on unconscionability
grounds. It purports to waive liability for every action or inaction and does not exclude from its
range intentional or recklessly negligent torts of its own employees. Not all courts look kindly on a
blanket waiver of any responsibility to the other party to the contract. See, e.g., Anderson &
Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709, 712 (Idaho 1979) (“[It is] well established that
courts look with disfavor on such attempts to avoid liability [blanket waiver of liability provisions]
and construe such provisions strictly against the person relying on them, especially when that person
is the preparer of the document.” (citing Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Seabord Sur. Co., 318 P.2d 84 (Cal.
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The minors’ written disclaimers on the copy of their submitted works
indicated they did not consent to the archiving of their works by Turnitin.248
In a brick-and-mortar context, this act would create a counteroffer.
Understandably, OSPs must rely on computer interface and the program
does not screen for deviations in acceptance and counteroffer, although it
could theoretically be coded to do that. The fact that demonstrations of
intent cognizable in the real world are ignored online may be another reason
to subject them to stricter scrutiny.
The infancy doctrine may be archaic. Some courts and commentators
seem leery of the doctrine, but abandonment at this point in time, in which
the legal environment is unsupportive of consumers generally and without
other robust policing mechanisms, may not be optimal. Moreover,
cyberspace is not the place to foreground an erosion of the doctrine, if
indeed that is the right choice. The juxtaposition of the particular risks
involving TOS and the particular tendencies of most youth suggest TOS
present an inappropriate context for experimenting with removing traditional
protections for minors.
IV. PHISHING FOR MINORS’ BUSINESS
Professor Daniel argues that the continued application of the infancy
doctrine would be devastating in digital markets, and so concludes the
doctrine should be abandoned.249 I propose that the economic implications
would be significant, but not disastrous. In Part IV.A, I discuss how minors
make purchases online and the extent to which these mechanisms of
payment provide any protection to vendors. But, as mentioned above,
businesses’ right to payment is only one part of the transaction; the right to
rely on the TOS provisions is also threatened by the infancy doctrine. In
Part IV.B, I discuss how online businesses, even those offering “free”
services, may have an economic stake in the enforceability of TOS, whether
or not the social value of such economic benefits are, or should be,
outweighed by consumer interests. Reliance on TOS to form a substantial
part of the economic bargain is particularly unwise when attempting to
impose TOS on minors.
In Part IV.C, I discuss how the risks of disaffirmance can be managed if
OSPs make reasonable changes to their practices. Of course, these changes
Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Talley v. Skelly Oil Co., 433 P.2d 425 (Kan. 1967); Walker Bank & Trust Co.
v. First Sec. Corp., 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959))).
248. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 478.
249. Daniel, supra note 7, at 255.
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may not be sufficient if use of the infancy doctrine balloons extraordinarily.
In such an event, the infancy doctrine, and the policies supporting it, may
need a major reassessment. In the meantime, a refresher on the policies
behind the infancy doctrine may lead to substantial improvements in markets
aimed at minors.
A. Caching in on Minors
Teenagers’ buying power in 2006 was $79.7 billion and is expected to
increase to $91.1 billion in 2011 despite an estimated 3% decline in the
teenage population during that time.250 According to a 2010 Pew Research
Center Internet study, the 48% of wired teens who now purchase online is a
significant increase from the “31% who had done so in 2000.”251 With this
trend towards increased participation in the online marketplace, minors have
the potential to cause serious economic consequences to online businesses
by disaffirming contracts in droves.
Minors have access to money, and they spend it. Teens have always had
a high rate of summer employment, with fifty-one percent employed in June
2000, although teen employment is down during the current recession.252
Family allowance programs, gifts, and “as needed” money from parents and
other relatives also contribute to disposable teen income.253 According to a
2006 study, teens had eighty billion dollars in yearly income from
allowances, work around the house, or employment.254 These teenagers
were estimated to control $4,500 in discretionary spending,255 with “boys
under 18 hav[ing] an average of $525 to spend each month, while girls have
$430.”256

250. Teen Market to Surpass $200 Billion by 2011, Despite Population Decline, MARKETING
CHARTS (June 28, 2007), http://www.marketingcharts.com/interactive/teen-market-to-surpass-200billion-by-2011-despite-population-decline-817 [hereinafter Teen Market]; see also DEBRA AHO
WILLIAMSON, EMARKETER, TWEENS AND TEENS ONLINE: FROM MARIO TO MYSPACE 4 (Oct. 2006),
available at http://www.emarketer.com/Reports/All/Em_tweens_oct06.aspx (revealing that in 2005,
children ages three to eleven commanded $18.3 billion in spending power, which was projected to
increase to $21.4 billion in 2010).
251. LENHART ET AL., supra note 8, at 4.
252. Stephanie Pappas, Soaring Teen Unemployment Could Have Lifetime Effects, LIVE SCIENCE
(Aug. 22, 2010), http://www.livescience.com/health/recession-impacting-teenage-employmentopportunities.html.
253. Teen Market, supra note 250; M. J. Alhabeeb, Teenagers’ Money, Discretionary Spending
and Saving, 7 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 123, 124 (1996) (“Teens have three major sources of
income: family allowances, earnings from part-time employment, and gifts and other funds received
from parents and relatives.”).
254. BROWN & WASHTON, supra note 9, at 3.
255. MEDIAMARK RESEARCH INC., supra note 6, at 4.
256. Renee M. Covino, Cracking the Kid/Candy Code, ALLBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 1, 2007),
http://www.allbusiness.com/marketing-advertising/market-groups-youth-market-teens/5500615-
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Businesses rely on minors. If minors disaffirm, in most states they can
demand back any amounts paid to the adult, subject only to the obligation to
return whatever physical consideration is still in the minor’s possession, if
any. Thus, as it currently stands, the infancy doctrine could lead to
significant direct economic losses in the inability to collect monies
committed by contract or, alternatively, from an obligation to refund
consideration paid by a minor.
Vendors online may find a certain solace in believing a parent is
secondarily liable for online charges made by minors. However, assuming
that every credit card charge means a parent has assumed liability to pay the
money (let alone be bound to the TOS) is a mistake. It is true that minors
frequently do make online charges using a parent’s credit card, and most of
the time, the parent’s credit card company would be liable for the money
part of the transaction at least, but not always. Assuming the minor has
actual authority to use the card, the adult owner of the card becomes liable to
pay, even if the minor does not. If the minor does not have authority, then
the card is treated as stolen, and the other party to the disaffirmed contract
must return the money paid by the minor and cannot look to the card owner
or to the card company that will likely charge back any credit given on that
sale.257 In any event, if the minor disaffirms, the vendor could demand
payment from the adult or the adult’s credit card company.258 But the
agreement with the card issuer does not bind the parent owner of the credit
card to comply with the OSPs’ TOS.
Minors have ways to pay without using a parent’s credit card. A minor
may, in limited cases, own a regular credit card issued before the Credit
Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 became
effective.259 The Act now prohibits issuing credit cards to anyone under age

1.html. Of these teenagers, about twenty-six percent had placed an Internet order in the year before
the survey. BROWN & WASHTON, supra note 9, at 211.
257. See Fifth Third Bank v. Gilbert, 478 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1984); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1643(d) (2010) (“[Subject to a few exceptions], a cardholder incurs no liability from the
unauthorized use of a credit card.”).
258. Mary Elizabeth Matthews, Credit Cards—Authorized and Unauthorized Use, 13 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 233, 238 (1994) (detailing the various parties and contracts involved in a credit card
transaction and citing JEFFREY B. REITMAN ET AL., 10 BANKING LAW § 259.02[1]–[3] (1989)).
259. Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24,
123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Certain provisions of the
Act became effective on February 22, 2010. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Jan. 12, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20100112a.htm.
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twenty-one,260 unless signed by an adult willing to be jointly liable for any
debts,261 or supported by evidence of “independent means of repaying any
obligation.”262 Under the Act, an unemancipated minor may be able to
establish independent funds and obtain a card. Although allowing such a
minor out of a transaction may push the boundaries of the infancy doctrine
policies, there is no established exception applicable.
Teens typically deposit the money they control into a bank account and
direct debits from such accounts are permitted by many OSPs. If a
transaction is later voided and the amount paid by the minor refunded, the
adult who takes a debit drawn on such account does not have a claim against
the bank.263 The bank does not secondarily guarantee payment. Minors can
also use cash to purchase prepaid credit cards, and may be the recipients of
prepaid gift cards.264 But, as discussed above, the loss of expected payment
is only one half of the consequences of disaffirmance.
B. A Glitch in Processing TOS
Clearly an online business would be hurt if an obligation to pay were not
enforceable, but economic losses may arise in other ways. In addition, many
of the most popular online service sites are “free.” Outside of the
expectation of payment, OSPs may suffer a cost in being stripped of an
enforceable TOS although measurement of that cost is more subtle. Even if
an OSP does not require direct payment, economic benefits are what induce
an OSP to provide a free service (and keep their shareholders from suing the
board of directors for giving away corporate resources). These benefits
include advertising revenue, brand recognition, increased likelihood that
users of free services will also purchase revenue generating services, and so
forth. If the OSPs may be subject to disputes without any protection from a
TOS, the cost of providing non-chargeable services may outweigh these
benefits.
For instance, the economic viability of Turnitin, the “free” plagiarism
detection program in iParadigms, is dependent on retaining a database of

260. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(c)(8)(A) (West 2010) (“No credit card may be issued to, or open end
consumer credit plan established by or on behalf of, a consumer who has not attained the age of
21 . . . .”).
261. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(i).
262. Id. § 1637(c)(8)(B)(ii).
263. The bank acts only as an agent in honoring the drawer’s order to pay. See U.C.C. § 3-414
(2002). Only the owner of the account who signs or directs payment is liable on the underlying
transaction unless the payment is a certified or cashier’s check signed by the bank. See U.C.C. § 3401(a) (2006).
264. These kinds of cards are defined and regulated in the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693l(-1) (West 2009).
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prior submissions against which to check future submissions.265 The TOS
includes a waiver that arguably protects it from a lawsuit for copyright
infringement liability for this practice.266 Although both the district court
and the Fourth Circuit were able to construct a fair use exception protecting
iParadigms from copyright infringement claims without ultimately relying
on the waiver, in another case, the fair use exception may not be available.
An OSP could avoid the normative pitfalls of TOS and provide a clear and
obvious provision permitting the exchange of data for the use of the service.
The availability of such programs is unquestionably linked to the ability to
make some bargains with users. The right of minors to disaffirm puts these
benefits at risk.
Putting aside for the moment the disputes about the application of
economic theory and the reality of eventual consumer benefits, a matter on
which I do not intend to comment, obviously economic consequences attach
to TOS terms. Some consequences may benefit only the bottom line of the
OSP, but having some bottom line is essential to staying in business.
According to Judge Easterbrook, “Terms and conditions offered by
contract reflect private ordering, essential to the efficient functioning of
markets.”267 Maureen O’Rourke agrees: “[T]erms of use are no less a part of
‘the product’ than are the size of the database and the speed with which the
software [works].”268 Further, “[t]his method of contracting facilitates a
mass market that might otherwise not exist by saving the transaction costs of
face-to-face bargaining. The particular terms help the OSP recoup its
investment while not forcing it to charge an exorbitant price.”269
An example of a TOS that validly decreases the cost of doing business is
a reasonable limitation on the license to use software. What if Matthew
Zeidenberg had been seventeen at the time he purchased and uploaded
software from ProCD? The district court in that case found that the database
provided by ProCD was not protected under the Copyright Act or the
Computer Crimes Act, and that all the state claims were preempted by

265. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477–78 (E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
266. Id. at 478.
267. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting in part Am.
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228 (1995)).
268. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 69 (1997) (quoting ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453).
269. Id. at 68.
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federal law.270 This conclusion was assumed to be true on appeal to the
Seventh Circuit.271 Thus, the courts proceeded on the assumption that, in the
absence of an enforceable contract, nothing prevented Zeidenberg, or anyone
else, from purchasing access to the ProCD database at the private consumer
price and then using it for commercial purposes.
The district court refused to enforce the contract, concluding that
“because defendants did not have the opportunity to bargain or object to the
proposed user agreement or even review it before purchase and they did not
assent to the terms explicitly after they learned of them, they are not bound
by the user agreement.”272 On appeal, all of Judge Easterbrook’s efforts to
find an enforceable contract would have been for naught if Zeidenberg could
then simply disaffirm the contract using the infancy doctrine.273
Applicability of the TOS was economically significant in that case even
though Zeidenberg had paid the purchase price and was not asking for a
refund.
In addition, according to Judge Easterbrook’s explanation of price
discrimination against commercial users and arbitrage, if all restrictions in
license agreements were unenforceable, databases such as those compiled by
ProCD, which “cost more than $10 million to compile and [was] expensive
to keep current,” would become prohibitively expensive for consumers and
most commercial clients.274 As Judge Easterbrook notes, “To the extent

270. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996). The court also held that:
(1) users did not infringe copyrighted software by downloading it onto their computer’s
hard drive for purposes of making uncopyrightable listings available on Internet; (2) users
were not bound by “shrinkwrap license” included with the software; (3) state law breach
of contract and misappropriation claims were preempted by Copyright Act; and (4)
Computer Crimes Act claim, as to users’ conduct, was preempted.
Id. at 640.
271. ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447. However, this assumption is in some respects wrong. See Nancy S.
Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103 (explaining that, although it was
uncertain that intellectual property law protected software, the underlying code or program is subject
to copyright protection and, if a patent has been filed for the code, to patent law protection).
272. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655.
273. As to the preemption findings of the district court, Judge Easterbrook concludes by stating
that promises to pay for intellectual property can be enforced even though federal law “offers no
protection against third-party uses of that property.” ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454. Nothing in the
opinion addresses whether any other possible remedy exists without an enforceable contract.
274. Id. at 1449.
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single price . . . it
would have to raise the price . . . . [and consumers] would cease to buy if the price rose
substantially. If because of high elasticity of demand in the consumer segment of the
market the only way to make a profit turned out to be a price attractive to commercial
users alone, then all consumers would lose out—and so would the commercial clients,
who would have to pay more for the listings because ProCD could not obtain any
contribution toward costs from the consumer market.
Id.
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licenses facilitate distribution of object code while concealing the source
code (the point of a clause forbidding disassembly), they serve the same
procompetitive functions as does the law of trade secrets.”275 These
procompetitive benefits depend on an enforceable TOS.276
Another example of a provision that makes doing business cheaper,
although it may not always be fair when hidden deep in an incomprehensible
TOS, is a forum selection clause.277 The Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute noted that a contract with a forum selection clause allows
a business with national reach to avoid “litigation in several different fora,”
and “dispel[s] any confusion about where suits . . . must be brought . . .
sparing litigants . . . time and expense.”278 The Supreme Court then
referenced the Seventh Circuit’s language in Northwestern National
Insurance Co. v. Donovan, which notes the “huge convenience to [a
business] to be able to defend these suits in home territory.”279 In addition,
in the absence of a statute, attorneys’ fees are not recoverable by a party that
prevails in a dispute unless a contract term provides for fees,280 and, of
course, lawyers everywhere support such provisions.
Other provisions that may lower the cost of doing business are those that
identify as governing law a state with law familiar or favorable to the OSP,
proscribe rules for filing complaints, shorten statutes of limitations, and so
forth. The normative value to society in permitting mega-conglomerate
power-holders to impose such terms on consumers may be questionable.
But the economic value to those who have enough power to impose them is
clear.
275. Id. at 1455.
276. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding a
shrinkwrap agreement that prohibited viewing source code for reverse engineering, even though
reverse engineering is a fair use).
277. The MySpace TOS, for example, contains a term acknowledging that the licensee waives all
rights to trial by jury for any litigation resulting from the use of its services and further restricts all
conflict resolution to the jurisdiction of New York. MySpace TOS, supra note 219, ¶ 16. eBay
explains that by accepting its TOS, the licensee agrees to resolve any dispute either in “the courts
located within Santa Clara County” or through arbitration if the claim is under $10,000. Your User
Agreement, EBAY, para. 17 (“Legal Disputes”), http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/useragreement.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). The Amazon TOS contains a term subjecting the
licensee to personal jurisdiction in the state of Washington and demanding that all disputes will be
settled within Washington courts. Amazon TOS, supra note 230, para. 12 (“Disputes”).
278. 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991).
279. 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990).
280. 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEYS’ FEES § 6:1 (3d ed. 2010) (“The ‘American Rule,’ which
has been consistently applied throughout the United States, is that a litigant is ordinarily not entitled
to collect attorneys’ fees from the opposing party in the absence of a statute or court rule or a
contractual provision.”).
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In summary, the infancy doctrine allows a minor to walk away from
unreasonable contract obligations and from contract obligations that may
have been reasonable if imposed on an adult—and to obtain restitution of
any consideration she has already paid, subject to an offset in a minority of
jurisdictions.281 The right to assert this doctrine, in all of its breadth, is
bounded by limited established defenses.282 It is no surprise that, with
increased use, the infancy doctrine would ultimately discourage online
businesses from contracting with minors. But then, this disincentive is,
precisely, one of the stated purposes of the doctrine.283 In the next subpart, I
suggest how online businesses should respond to the threat of the infancy
doctrine.
C. Defragmenting a Volatile Situation
In this article, I acknowledge that the infancy doctrine may be in need of
reassessment, but that reassessment must be thoughtful and new standards
should be carefully tailored to the merits and abuses of modern markets and
the capacities of minors. In addition, I recommend that such reassessment
take place in conventional contract forums before being attempted with
respect to TOS. However, until that reassessment happens, online
businesses can, and must, respond appropriately to the doctrine, as it is now
the law. I offer some common sense suggestions for dealing with a teen
market.
Of course, we can all imagine how the infancy doctrine may be abused.
Most, if not all, of the general categories of abuse are not new, and have
been contemplated by courts and legislatures considering the doctrine over
the last century.284 In addition, of course, courts may police actions that rise
to the level of bad faith.285 One aspect of current technological markets not
previously included in the calculation of the infancy doctrine may be the
need for limited software licenses. And, perhaps, further limitations should
target a minor’s premeditated and repeated use of the doctrine. Research on
the frequency of youth taking advantage of uninformed casual sellers and
small businesses is warranted, even if the conduct is not what would
traditionally be identified as bad faith. Elsewhere, I offer suggestions for
additional exceptions to, and some amelioration of, the burdens of enforcing
the infancy doctrine.286

281. See supra text accompanying notes 94–102.
282. See supra Part II.B–D.
283. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 210 (2004) (“It is the policy of the law to . . . discourage adults from
contracting with an infant.”).
284. Id. (citing cases as early as 1920).
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. See Preston & Crowther, supra note 15.
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But the values that underlie the infancy doctrine are powerful. The
infancy doctrine should at least have the effect of inducing online businesses
to treat minors fairly and avoid outrageous TOS provisions. This treatment
will minimize the risk of dissatisfaction, which leads to disaffirmation of
their contracts. Minors who enter fair transactions for products they want in
transactions that go smoothly are unlikely to seek to avoid the contract. The
infancy doctrine is admirable, although currently ineffective, as a
preventative mechanism encouraging the responsible exercise of the
dominant power held by companies that would otherwise insist on imposing
adhesive contracts with overreaching clauses on vulnerable populations.
In addition, perhaps a more ethical approach to tapping the teen market
would include affirmative efforts to encourage the involvement of a parent.
Although the discussion about youth safety on the Internet is highly
contentious, most experts agree that players in the Internet industry need to
help parents “be more actively engaged in stewarding young people’s
adoption of technology and safe practices. They need accurate information
about risks, solid implementable ideas for the home, places to go to learn
more, and clear information about what to do if a problem arises.”287 The
risks to children of a marketplace that comes into their homes at any hour of
the day and night and is accessible with a click include the risk of incurring
legal and financial obligations without sufficient understanding.288 Of
course, some parents may be unenthusiastic about taking time to open
accounts with online vendors that allow them to supervise (and assume
contractual liability) for the online activity of minors. Some minors will be
equally unenthusiastic about cluing in their parents to their online lives. But
an ethical business will be willing to facilitate the involvement of parents.
Another solution for online businesses that are unwilling to reduce the
risk by writing balanced contracts for quality products and services or by
involving parents, is to adjust their practices. The most obvious measure is
to conduct some reasonable age investigation.
Although such an
investigation would not be foolproof, an OSP has a defense if it investigates
a representation of age with sufficient caution so that reliance on it is in

287. YOUTH SAFETY ON A LIVING INTERNET: REPORT OF THE ONLINE SAFETY AND TECHNOLOGY
WORKING GROUP 33 (June 4, 2010), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2010/
OSTWG_Final_Report_070610.pdf. The predominately industry writers of this report argue that
“research . . . shows that many young people have adopted and continue to adopt effective strategies
to deflect dangers from both adult criminals and their misbehaving peers. [But t]his is not to suggest
that youth don’t need adult supervision and support . . . .” Id. at 33–34.
288. See id. at 16.
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good faith. As explained above in Part II.D,289 the OSPs of many of the
most popular online services may include a recital of adulthood somewhere
in a TOS, but they take no efforts to draw sufficient attention to the
representation to credibly argue it was made knowingly. They, for the most
part, ignore the contrary birthdates that users enter to open an account. And
they undertake no investigation efforts. The existing exception for
fraudulent misrepresentation is therefore entirely unavailing. This total
inaction does not mean that notice and reasonable investigation practices are
impossible to implement. If digital marketers wanted to take seriously
avoiding contracts with minors, options for verifying age must be explored.
But it is disingenuous for them to argue difficulties with age verification as
an objection to the infancy doctrine. So far, most OSPs are not taking even
the simple verification steps they know how to take to avoid dealing with
pre-teens. If they wanted to avoid dealing with all minors, they could do at
least that much.
The elephant in the room is, of course, that such measures will naturally
reduce the number of minors with whom to do business. And online
businesses are greedy. If OSPs choose not to take these precautions, they
have the choice to simply absorb the business losses associated with
occasional disaffirmance. But courts ought not come to their rescue. So we
return full circle to the policy of protecting minors. Responsible businesses
have options, but not cost-free options.
V. CONCLUSION
Minors have long been viewed as deserving protections from adults and
from themselves in making economic and legal decisions. The infancy
doctrine is still on the books and, despite some muddled verbiage, no
doctrinal development suggests that it is not applicable to online contracts.
Using benefits derived under the contract, making unknowing
representations of age, and exercising exceptional computer savvy will not
deprive a minor of the right to void a TOS. Simply using the doctrine for its
express purposes is not bad faith, although, in fact, both conniving and
innocent adults who deal with minors will pay the price the doctrine extracts.
Steering adults away from hard bargaining with minors, such as evidenced
by TOS, is the point. While there are some defenses and exceptions to the
infancy doctrine, including one for bad faith, the vast majority of online
TOS are squarely subject to avoidance.
The rush of teens into the market may require a meaningful inquiry into
the policies of the infancy doctrine, but the arena in which to begin that
discussion should not be TOS. Contract abuses are particularly prevalent in

289. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
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TOS formation and terms. Further, the processes of online contracting
encourage thoughtless and impulsive behavior, a problem particularly
troubling for teens already prone to these qualities.
Notwithstanding the infancy doctrine, a look at the market reveals adults
are more than willing to contract with minors; they affirmatively woo them.
One risk is nonpayment, or a demand for refund, when a contract is voided.
Some protections are built into online transactions because of the use of
credit cards frequently tied to parents’ accounts. But minors are not limited
to credit cards and, more importantly, recourse against a parent for the price
does not mean that the other TOS terms will be enforceable against anyone.
TOS provide certain economic benefits to OSPs, some quite legitimately,
although others may be overreaching. Contract avoidance under the infancy
doctrine thus presents a significant threat to businesses relying on minors.
But until legislatures or courts thoughtfully rewrite the doctrine, it will apply
even in cyberspace.
Certainly, the infancy doctrine may become an unmanageable factor in
digital market economics.
But dramatic changes without serious
consideration of historical values and long-term implications ought not occur
in an arena where the temptation to commit contract abuses is apparent and
in a judicial context where consumer protection is undervalued. At least
with respect to TOS, in this imbalance, the infancy doctrine should be
enforced—and perhaps publicized to encourage its use.
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